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DESPERATELY DUCKING SLAVERY: 
DRED SCOTT AND CONTEMPORARY 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Mark A. Graber* 
Contemporary constitutional theory rests on three premises. 
Brown v. Board of Education was correct, Lochner v. New York 
was wrong, and Dred Scott v. Sandford was also wrong. A few 
intrepid souls question whether Brown was correctly decided 
(although they would not have the Supreme Court overrule that 
decision}.! Some proponents of law and economics favor reviv-
ing the freedom of contract and the Lochner decision.z No one, 
however, wishes to rethink the universal condemnation of Dred 
Scott.3 "American legal and constitutional scholars," The Oxford 
Companion to the Supreme Court states, "consider the Dred Scott 
decision to be the worst ever rendered by the Supreme Court."4 
David Currie's encyclopedic The Constitution in the Supreme 
Court maintains that the decision was "bad policy," "bad judicial 
politics" and "bad law."s Commentators across the political 
spectrum describe Dred Scott as "the worst constitutional deci-
sion of the nineteenth century,"6 "the worst atrocity in the 
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Supreme Court's history,"7 "the most disastrous opinion the 
Supreme Court has ever issued,"s "the most odious action ever 
taken by a branch of the federal government,"9 a "ghastly er-
ror,"1o a "tragic failure to follow the terms of the Constitution,"ll 
"a gross abuse of trust,"1z "a lie before God,"13 and "judicial re-
view at its worst. "14 In the words of former Chief Justice Charles 
Evans Hughes, the Dred Scott decision was a "self-inflicted 
[wound]" that almost destroyed the Supreme Court.ts 
This agreement that Dred Scott was a "public calamity"I6 
masks a deeper disagreement over exactly what was wrong with 
the Supreme Court's decision. Each school of contemporary 
constitutional thought claims Dred Scott embarrasses rival theo-
ries. Proponents of judicial restraint maintain that Chief Justice 
Roger Taney's opinion demonstrates the evils that result when 
federal justices prevent the elected branches of government from 
resolving major social disputes. Originalists maintain that theTa-
ney opinion demonstrates the evils that result when constitu-
tional authorities fail to be tethered by precedent or the original 
meaning of the constitution. Aspirational theorists maintain that 
the Taney opinion demonstrates the evils that result when consti-
tutional authorities are too tethered by precedent or the original 
meaning of the constitution. Virtually every commentator who 
condemns Dred Scott insists that Taney could not have reached 
that decision's proslavery and racist conclusions had he under-
stood or adhered to the correct theory of the judicial function in 
constitutional cases. Following Robert Cover's analysis of fugi-
tive slave cases, leading members of all schools of contemporary 
7. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Dred Again: Originalism's Forgotten Past, 10 Const. 
Comm. 37, 41 (1993). 
8. Robert G. McCloskey, The American Supreme Court 62 (revised by Sanford 
Levinson) (U. of Chicago Press, 2d ed. 1994). 
9. Gary J. Jacobsohn, The Supreme Court and the Decline of Constitutional Aspira· 
tion 44 (Rowman & Littlefield, 1986). 
10. Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court and the Idea of Progress 41 (Harper & 
Row, 1970). 
11. William Bradford Reynolds, Another View: Our Magnificent Constitution, 40 
Vand. L. Rev. 1343, 1348 (1987). 
12. Edward S. Corwin, The Dred Scott Case in the Light of Contemporary Legal 
Doctrines, in Richard Loss, ed., 2 The Judiciary, Corwin on the Constitution, 313 (Cornell 
U. Press, 1987). 
13. Frederick Douglass, 3 The Frederick Douglass Papers: Series One: Speeches, De· 
bates, and Interviews, 1855-63 at 147 (Yale U. Press, 1985). 
14. Malcolm M. Feeley and Samuel Krislov, Constitutional Law 34 (Scott, Foresman 
and Company, 2d ed. 1990). 
15. Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States: Its Foundation, 
Methods and Achievements: An Interpretation 50 (Columbia U. Press, 1928). 
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constitutional thought suggest that many Supreme Court justices 
who protected slavery and declared free blacks to be non-citizens 
supported those evils because they "shared a jurisprudence that 
fostered imprecise thinking about the nature of the choices 
available. "t7 
These contemporary uses of the Dred Scott decision to dis-
credit rival theories are fruitless. No prominent approach to the 
judicial function compels any result in that case. Both the denial 
of congressional power over slavery in the territories and the 
claim that former slaves could not be American citizens can be 
supported (and opposed) by jurists sincerely committed to insti-
tutional, historical and aspirational theories. The majority opin-
ions in Dred Scott used many different constitutional arguments 
to reach their immoral conclusions and the dissents in that case 
similarly relied on various constitutional logics. For these rea-
sons, the standard analogies between Dred Scott and controver-
sial twentieth century judicial opinions fail. A proper 
appreciation of the flaws in the Dred Scott majority opinions 
does not privilege any side to debates over whether Roe v. Wade 
and other contemporary exercises of the judicial power are con-
stitutionally legitimate. 
The argument laid out below is that Dred Scott is constitu-
tionally plausible in any contemporary constitutional rhetoric, 
not that the result in that case follows logically from institutional, 
historical, or aspirational understandings of the judicial function 
in constitutional cases. Part I briefly discusses what the Dred 
Scott Court decided, the criticisms of that decision, and their con-
temporary implications. Part II explains why these criticisms are 
inadequate and demonstrates how a judge committed to any con-
temporary theory of judicial review could have supported or op-
posed the holding in Dred Scott. Part III explains why efforts to 
use slavery to bash rival theories of constitutional interpretation 
are fruitless. All theories of contemporary constitutional inter-
pretation are vulnerable to unique pro-slavery outcomes, circum-
stances in which that theory might compel a more pro-slavery 
result than rival theories. 
This revisionist account of Dred Scott is less designed to re-
habilitate the Taney Court than to expose the result orientation 
of all schools of contemporary constitutional thought. Constitu-
tional theorists ritually proclaim adherence to the distinction be-
17. Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process 257 (Yale 
U. Press, 1975). See Ronald Dworkin, The Law of the Slave Catchers, Times Literary 
Supplement, 1437 (Dec. 5, 1975). 
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tween constitutionality and justice,ts but few academic lawyers 
highlight the constitutional evils that they believe would result 
should judges adopt the "correct" theory of the judicial function 
in constitutional cases. Controversial cases in leading studies 
consistently come out "right," as "right" is defined by the theo-
rist's political commitments. Conservative constitutional com-
mentators insist that principled justices would sustain bans on 
abortion and strike down affirmative action policies; their liberal 
peers insist that principled justices would strike down bans on 
abortion and sustain affirmative action policies.19 Libertarians 
would have justices strike down bans on abortion and affirmative 
action policies;zo democrats would have justices sustain both 
measures.21 When a contemporary consensus exists on the just 
policy, constitutional commentators of all political persuasions 
agree that the policy is also constitutionally mandated. No prom-
inent theorist admits that Dred Scott might have been a legiti-
mate exercise of judicial review, and no prominent theorist 
would have the judiciary overrule Brown v. Board of Education. 
Originalists who claim that constitutional theory should be indif-
ferent to results nevertheless go to great, probably implausible, 
lengths to demonstrate that the persons responsible for the equal 
protection clause intended to forbid racially segregated schools.22 
This consensus that Dred Scott was wrong (and Brown was 
right) inhibits serious discussion of constitutional evils. As long 
as the constitution is interpreted as requiring or at least permit-
ting those policies a given commentator thinks just, no pressing 
18. See Bork, The Tempting of America at 264 (cited in note 6); Alexander M. 
Bickel, The Morality of Consent 123 (Yale U. Press, 1975); Laurence H. Tribe and Michael 
C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution 14-16, 22 (Harvard U. Press, 1991); Ronald Dwor-
kin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 10-11 (Harvard U. 
Press, 1996). 
19. Compare Bork, The Tempting of America at 107-116, 359-61 (cited in note 6) 
with Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution 149-50, 270-85, 331-32 (Harvard U. Press, 
1993). 
20. See Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason (Harvard U. Press, 1992); Richard A. 
Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial 
Minorities, in Philip B. Kurland, ed., 1974 Supreme Court Review (U. of Chicago Press, 
1975). 
21. See John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review 170-72 
(Harvard U. Press, 1980); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf" A Comment on Roe 
v. Wade, 82 Yale LJ. 920 (1973). 
22. See Bork, The Tempting of America at 76, 82-83 (cited in note 6); Michael W. 
McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 Va. L. Rev. 947 (1995). For 
critiques of this position, see Rogers M. Smith, The Inherent Deceptiveness of Constitu-
tional Discourse, in Ian Shapiro, ed., NOMOS XL: Integrity and Conscience (New York 
U. Press, 1997) (forthcoming) (copy on file with author); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, 
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 Va. L. 
Rev. 1881 (1995). 
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political reason exists for examining the constitution's authority. 
That examination would seem more urgent had contemporary 
feminists concluded that the Fourteenth Amendment protects fe-
tal life or contemporary evangelicals concluded that the constitu-
tion does require a wall of separation between church and state. 
Such citizens might wonder why Americans should honor a con-
stitution that mandates such obvious injustices. William Lloyd 
Garrison, after all, publicly burned the constitution when he con-
cluded that the constitution protected slavery.z3 By highlighting 
the plausible constitutional arguments in favor of the result in 
Dred Scott, I hope to begin a better discussion among constitu-
tional commentators as to the original constitution's imperfec-
tions and the reasons for adhering even to a constitution that 
might sanction evil results. 
I. THE DRED SCOTT DECISION 
Dred Scott was a Missouri slave who went with his master, 
John Emerson, to a free state (Illinois) and a free territory (Min-
nesota) before he "voluntarily" returned with Emerson to Mis-
souri.24 On April 6, 1846, Scott and his wife Harriet sued their 
putative owner, claiming that their time spent on free soil made 
them free persons. Although their suit was successful in the trial 
court, that judgment was reversed by the state supreme court, 
which held that, as a matter of Missouri law, slave status reat-
tached whenever a slave voluntarily reentered a slave state from 
a free state or territory. Immediately following that defeat, Scott 
and his family brought a similar suit in federal court. The final 
result was no different. Their claims were rejected by the local 
Circuit Court and the United States Supreme Court sustained 
that rejection by a 7-2 vote, Justices Curtis and McLean 
dissenting.zs 
The precise holding of Dred Scott has never been entirely 
clear. All nine justices wrote opinions and the seven justices in 
the majority gave different reasons for rejecting Scott's appeal. 
Conventionally, the case stands for the two central propositions 
in Chief Justice Taney's opinion: 1) no black could be a citizen of 
23. The Meeting at Framingham, The Liberator 106 (July 7, 1854). See Walter M. 
Merrill, Against Wind and Tide: A Biography of Wm. Lloyd Ga"ison 268 (Harvard U. 
Press, 1%3). 
24. For a detailed account of the facts in Dred Scott, see Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) 393, 397-99 (1856); Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case: Its Signifi-
cance in American Law and Politics 239-49 (Oxford U. Press, 1978). 
25. For a detailed account of the procedural history of Dred Scott, see 
Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 250-83 (cited in note 24). 
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the United States;z6 and 2) slavery could not be constitutionally 
prohibited in American territories.27 This interpretation of Dred 
Scott may not be entirely correct. Only three other justices ex-
plicitly endorsed Taney's analysis of black citizenship.zs More-
over, some commentators argue that Taney's analysis of 
congressional power over slavery in the territories was obiter dic-
tum because his initial ruling on black citizenship meant that the 
court had no jurisdiction to hear the merits of Dred Scott's ap-
peal.29 Still, Taney's opinion was without apparent objection des-
ignated as the opinion of the Court,30 and debate over Dred Scott 
has concentrated on the flaws in Taney's discussion of black citi-
zenship and slavery in the territories. 
Taney's claims about black citizenship and slavery in the ter-
ritories have been criticized for three distinct and inconsistent 
failings. One line of criticism claims that Dred Scott rests on a 
mistaken theory of the proper role of judicial institutions in a 
democratic society. Robert McCloskey, Alexander Bickel, Lino 
Graglia, Cass Sunstein and other proponents of judicial restraint 
maintain that the Supreme Court should not have made any au-
thoritative attempt, even one based on the constitution, to re-
solve the constitutional controversy over the status of slavery in 
the territories.3t The other two criticisms claim that Dred Scott 
rests on a mistaken theory of constitutional interpretation. Rob-
26. Strictly speaking, the Taney Court ruling was limited to the proposition that "a 
negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as slaves" could not 
become an American citizen. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 403, 419. 
27. See Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 2 (cited in note 24). Taney's opinion 
also ruled that the Supreme Court should apply Missouri law when determining whether 
slave status reattached to Scott after he returned to Missouri from a free state or a free 
territory. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 452. Justice Nelson's concurring opinion was 
devoted exclusively to this choice of law question. Id. at 457-69 (Nelson, J., concurring). 
28. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 475·82 (Daniel, J., concurring); id. at 454 
(Wayne, J., concurring); id. at 469 (Grier, J., concurring). The other justices in the major-
ity, Justices Campbell, Catron, and Nelson, did not believe the citizenship issue was prop-
erly before the Court. Id. at 458 (Nelson, J., concurring); id. at 493 (Campbell, J., 
concurring); id. at 518 (Catron, J., concurring). 
29. See, i.e., Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 549 .(Foundation 
Press, 2d ed. 1988); Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 439 (cited in note 24) (noting 
other contemporaneous claims of "obiter"). 
30. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 399. For lengthy analyses concluding that five 
justices supported Taney's claims on both the procedure and substance of the citizenship 
issue, see John S. Vishneski III, What the Court Decided in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 32 
Am. J. Legal Hist. 373 (1988); Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 2, 325-34 (cited in 
note 24). 
31. McCloskey, American Supreme Court at 60-62 (cited in note 8); Bickel, The Mo-
rality of Consent 36-37 (cited in note 18); Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: 
Posner on Bark, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1019, 1036 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Forward: Leaving 
Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 49 (1996); Robert A. Burt, What was Wrong with 
Dred Scott, What's Right about Brown, 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1, 3, 19-20 (1985); Wil-
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ert Bork, David Currie, Don Fehrenbacher and other historicists 
condemn the Taney opinion for relying on personal notions of 
justice instead of on the specific norms set down by the constitu-
tional framers and previous judicial precedents.32 Thurgood 
Marshall, Sotirios Barber, Christopher Eisgruber and other as-
pirationalists, in contrast, condemn the Taney opinion for not 
tempering the specific policies set out by the constitutional fram-
ers and past judicial precedents with more general notions of 
constitutional and human right.33 
The commentators who make these criticisms are not pri-
marily interesting in beating dead justices. By demonstrating 
that Dred Scott was the product of an erroneous conception of 
constitutional interpretation or of the judicial function, each 
school of contemporary constitutional thought hopes to discredit 
rival theories and the modern judicial opinions they believe rely 
on those theories. Fehrenbacher worries that commentators who 
support the Warren Court's expansion of individual liberties 
"have yet to comprehend the full meaning ... of the Dred Scott 
decision."34 Lea VanderVelde and Sandhya Subramanian, by 
comparison, think that "Dred Scott deprived modern commenta-
tors of an opportunity ... to recognize a new kind of freedom-a 
freedom of family continuity, cohesion, autonomy, and pri-
vacy."3s The real target of historical and institutional critiques of 
Dred Scott is typically Roe v. Wade, a decision which many pro-
ponents of judicial restraint and originalism claim repeats Ta-
ney's most salient errors. "Who says Roe," Robert Bork 
liam H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It Is 313 (William Morrow and 
Company, 1987). 
32. Bork, The Tempting of America at 28-34 (cited in note 6); Currie, The Constitu-
tion at 264-73 (cited in note 5); Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 559 (cited in note 
24); Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64 
Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 89, 101 (1988); Reynolds, 40 Vand. L. Rev. at 1348 (cited in note 11); 
Corwin, Dred Scott Case at 307-13 (cited in note 12); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 114 S. Ct. 909, 998, 1003 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part). 
33. Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitu-
tion, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1987); Thurgood Marshall, The Constitution's BicentenniaL· 
Commemorating the Wrong Document?, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1337, 1340 (1987); see Sotirios 
A. Barber, Whither Moral Realism in Constitutional Theory? A Reply to Professor Mc-
Connell, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 111, 126-27 (1988); Eisgruber, 10 Const. Comm. at 41, 47-
49, 56-57, 61-62 (cited in note 7); Jacobsohn, The Supreme Court at 8 (cited in note 9); 
Dworkin, Slave Catchers at 437 (cited in note 17). 
34. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 595 (cited in note 24). 
35. Lea VanderVelde and Sandhya Subramanian, Mrs. Dred Scott, 106 Yale L.J. 
1033, 1036 (1997). 
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proclaims, "must say ... Scott."36 Aspirational theorists, in re-
sponse, charge contemporary opponents of liberal judicial poli-
cymaking with using the same originalist methods that Taney 
used in Dred Scott. Christopher Eisgruber suggests that such 
prominent opponents of Roe as Bork and Justice Antonin Scalia 
"adhere ... to a professional credo that mimics Taney's indiffer-
ence to injustice."37 
Why contemporary scholars think analogies to Dred Scott 
undermine competing constitutional theories is not entirely clear. 
No one worries that a justice committed to the wrong theory of 
constitutional interpretation or the judicial function might pres-
ently conclude that Dred Scott remains good law. The Thirteenth 
Amendment clearly abolished slavery and the Fourteenth 
Amendment declares all persons born in the United States to be 
citizens of the United States. Proof that a particular constitu-
tional theory would have performed better than its rivals when 
applied to antebellum slavery cases, therefore, seems no more 
relevant to contemporary constitutional debates than proof that 
some other constitutional theory would have performed better 
than its rivals when applied to the constitutions of ancient Baby-
lon or medieval France. Studies of dead constitutions or dead 
constitutional provisions do serve as useful reminders that differ-
ent constitutional theories perform differently depending on the 
constitutional text, constitutional history and constitutional inter-
preters. American constitutionalists, however, are primarily in-
terested in the theory that performs best with respect to the 
present American Constitution, and performance with respect to 
other constitutions does not seem that relevant to this inquiry. 
The enthusiasm that proponents of gender equality display for 
originalism, for example, probably depends on whether they are 
interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment (whose framers did not 
intend to prohibit laws discriminating against women)3s or a state 
constitution which includes an Equal Rights Amendment ratified 
36. Bork, The Tempting of America at 32 (cited in note 6); see McConnell, 64 Chi.-
Kent. L. Rev. at 101 (cited in note 32); Casey, 114 S. a. at 998 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
37. Eisgruber, 10 Const. Conun. at 64 (cited in note 7). See VanderVelde and Sub-
ramanian, 106 Yale L.J. at 1119 (cited in note 35); Barber, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. at 126 
(cited in note 33); Marshall, 101 Harv. L. Rev. at 5 (cited in note 33). See also Sunstein, 
110 Harv. L. Rev. at 11 (cited in note 31). But see Eisgruber, 10 Const. Comm. at 63 
(cited in note 7) ("[s]earching for Taney's heir ... amount[s] to a witch hunt, not responsi-
ble academic criticism"). 
38. See Earl M. Maltz, The Constitution and Nonracial Discrimination: Alienage, 
Sex, and the Framers' Ideal of Equality, 7 Const. Conun. 251, 266-82 (1990). 
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at the peak of feminist influence in the legislature and 
community. 
Still, good reasons explain why Dred Scott matters very 
much to contemporary constitutional theorists. The Constitution 
derives its present authority, in part, from beliefs that the persons 
responsible for the original text were particularly wise and virtu-
ous. Challenges to the integrity of the framers, therefore, also 
challenge the integrity of the Constitution.39 "The historian who 
questions Jefferson," Paul Finkelman points out, "implicitly ques-
tions America. "40 Given how vulnerable the framers seem on 
slavery, constitutional theorists help validate the Constitution of 
1787 as a document still worthy of authoritative status by mini-
mizing the extent to which the original Constitution accommo-
dated that peculiar institution. By demonstrating that the 
influence of slavery on the original Constitution was confined to 
a very limited set of protections, contemporary constitutionalists 
also make plausible claims that the surgeries of 1865 and 1868 
successfully removed all traces of that constitutional wart from 
the body politic. No present constitutional institution, practice 
or right, in this view, was originally rooted even in part on the 
need to provide more security for human bondage or white 
supremacy. 
Debates over which constitutional theory was responsible 
for Dred Scott also remain relevant at present because, although 
the constitutional rules governing slavery have changed, no Arti-
cle V amendment has altered the basic constitutional institutions 
and practices in place when Taney's infamous ruling was handed 
down. These fundamental continuities suggest that general theo-
ries of judicial responsibility in constitutional cases may function 
today in much the same way they functioned 140 years ago. 
Thus, the institutional and interpretive practices responsible for 
the result in Dred Scott may, when adopted in the late twentieth 
century, result in judicial decisions that sanction other evils not 
specifically mandated by the words of the Constitution. If, for 
example, the judicial effort in 1857 to resolve a major political 
crisis caused the American political system to malfunction, then, 
39. Charles Beard, for example, thought that once Americans realized that the con-
stitution resulted from a struggle among different interests, they would more thoroughly 
investigate whether the Constitution of 17f57 served their interests. Charles A. Beard, An 
Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, !iii (The Free Press, 
1986). 
40. Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Libeny in the Age of Jeffer-
son 143 (M.E. Sharpe, 1996). See Gordon S. Wood, The Trials and Tribulations of 
Thomas Jefferson, in PeterS. Onuf, ed., Jeffersonian Legacies 395 (U. Press of Virginia 
1993). • 
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barring substantial change in the structure of governing institu-
tions, a judiciary that in 1997 engaged in the same practice would 
likely risk the same untoward consequences. 
These concerns may explain why contemporary commenta-
tors feel obliged to demonstrate that while Dred Scott could not 
have happened on their watch, that decision was a reasonable 
application of some rival approach to the judicial function. Insti-
tutionalists seek to privilege their family of theories by insisting 
that Dred Scott and Dred Scott-type evils will be avoided only 
when courts ordinarily defer to the elected branches of govern-
ment. Historicists respond that such evils will be avoided only 
when courts adhere to the wise policies endorsed by the framers. 
Aspirationalists reply that evil results will be avoided only when 
justices are guided by the framers' worthy ambitions. Unfortu-
nately, no constitutional theory can keep its promise to do no 
constitutional evil, either in Dred Scott or in other areas of law. 
II. CRITIQUING THE CRITIQUES 
The central problem with all critiques of Dred Scott is sim-
ple: judicial writings typically rely on a wide variety of interpre-
tive techniques4 t and that decision is no exception. One can find 
reasonable institutional, historical and aspirational arguments in 
both the majority opinions and in the dissents. For this reason, 
no member of the Taney Court should be regarded as the hidden 
demon or patron saint of any particular late twentieth century 
school of constitutional thought. The majority opinions do have 
their fair share of dubious assertions (as do the dissents), but a 
plausible case can be made in any constitutional language that 
before the passage of the Civil War Amendments descendants of 
American slaves could not be United States citizens and slavery 
could not be prohibited in American territories. Thus, to the ex-
tent that interpretive principles are judged by the results they 
yield in practice, Dred Scott does not help Americans choose be-
tween competing constitutional theories. No contemporary ap-
proach to the judicial function in constitutional cases is immune 
to proslavery results in the particular fact situation presented by 
Dred Scott or, for that matter, in the broader context provided by 
the American law of slavery. 
Critics of Dred Scott have been particularly derelict in ac-
knowledging the extent to which Taney's constitutional claims 
41. See Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution 93-94 (Oxford 
U. Press, 1982). 
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were well within the mainstream of antebellum constitutional 
thought. The judicial denial of black citizenship reflected beliefs 
held by the overwhelming majority of antebellum American ju-
rists. Virtually every state court that ruled on black citizenship 
before 1857 concluded for reasons similar to those advanced in 
the Dred Scott majority opinion that free persons of color were 
not state or American citizens.42 Four Attorneys General of the 
United States had previously rejected black citizenship43 and 
their view was endorsed by the leading northern treatise on juris-
42. Leech v. Cooley, 14 Miss. (6 Smedes & Marshall) 93, 99 (Miss. 1846); Bryan v. 
Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 198-207 (1853); Cooper and Worsham v. The Mayor and Aldermen of 
Savannah, 4 Ga. 68 (1848); State v. Morris, 2 Harr. 537 (Del. 1837); White v. Tax Collector, 
3 Rich. 136 (S.C. 1846); Hobbs and Others v. Fogg, 6 Watts 553, 556-59 (Pa. 1837); Amy v. 
Smith, 11 Ken. 326, 333-34 (1822); The People v. Hall, 4 Cal. 399,404-05 (1854); Pendleton 
v. The State, 6 Ark. 509, 511-12 (1846); Aldridge v. The Commonwealth, 2 Va. Cas. 447, 
449 (1824); Heirs of Jacob Bryan v. Dennis, Mary, and Others, 4 Fla. 445, 454 (1852); 
Benton v. Williams, 1 Dallam's Decisions 496, 497 (Tex. 1843). See also Cory et a/. v. 
Carter, 48 Ind. 327, 338-42 (1874) (finding that free blacks were not considered to be 
citizens of Indiana before the Civil War); Stoner v. State, 4 Mo. 614, 616 (1837) (possibly 
rejecting black citizenship). The Chief Justice of Connecticut ruled that free blacks were 
not citizens in a constitutional sense, Crandall v. The State. 10 Conn. 339. 345-47 (1834), 
though a later Connecticut opinion maintained that his view was not shared by the rest of 
his brethren. Opinion of the Judges of the Supreme Court, 32 Conn. 565, 565-66 (1865). 
The Supreme Court of North Carolina in 1838 did claim that "slaves manumitted here 
become free-men-and therefore if born within North Carolina are citizens of North Car-
olina." State v. Manuel, 20 N.C. 20, 25 (1838). Six years later that court significantly 
narrowed Manuel and held that "free people of color" were •·a separate and distinct 
class" and "cannot be considered as citizens in the largest sense of the term." State v. 
Newsom, 27 N.C. 250, 252, 254 (1844). Louisiana law is unclear. A majority opinion in 
1860 concluded that "[t)he African race are strangers to our Constitution." The African 
Methodist Episcopal Church v. City of New Orleans, 15 La. Ann. 441, 443 (1860). A 
concurring opinion maintained that ''[f)ree persons of color are regarded as persons 
under our law." African Methodist Episcopal Church, 15 La. Ann. at 445 (Merrick, C.J .. 
concurring). The weight of Louisiana cases seems to support the latter view. See State v. 
Harrison, 11 La. Ann. 722, 724 (1856) ("in the eye of the Louisiana law, there is. (with the 
exception of political rights of certain social privileges, and the obligations of jury and 
militia service) all the difference between a free man of color and a slave, that there is 
between a white man and a slave"); State v. Levy and Dreyfous, 5 La. Ann. 64 (1850). See 
also, Walsh v. Lallande, 25 La. Ann. 188, 189 (1873) (claiming that free blacks were con-
sidered citizens before the Civil War). The Supreme Court of Massachusetts was the only 
bench that before Dred Scott clearly indicated that free blacks were state citizens, and 
that tribunal did so in an opinion which sustained segregated schools in Boston. Roberts 
v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. 198, 206 (1849). 
43. Caleb Cushing, Right of Expatriation, 8 Op. Atty. Gen. 139 (1856); John Mac-
Pherson Berrien, Validity of South Carolina Police Bill, 2 Op. Atty. Gen. 426 (1831); 
Swisher, Taney at 154 (cited in note 3) (discussing a memo Taney wrote in 1832); William 
Wirt, Rights of Free Virginia Negroes, 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 506 (1821). Attorney General 
Hugh Legare did rule in 1843 that free persons of color were among the citizens eligible 
to purchase land under federal law. Legare reached this conclusion, however, because he 
"conceive[ d) the purpose of the lawgiver to be only to exclude aliens, ... men born and 
living under the ligeance of a foreign power-from the enjoyment of the contemplated 
privileges." HughS. Legare, Pre-emption Rights of Colored Persons, 4 Op. Atty. Gen., 
147, 147 (1843). Legare explicitly refused to consider whether free blacks were citizens in 
a political sense. 4 Op. Atty. Gen. at 147. 
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prudence, James Kent's Commentaries on American Law.44 
Even John Marshall may have claimed that persons of color were 
constitutionally barred from becoming American citizens.4s Ta-
ney's claim that the federal government had no power to bar 
slavery in the territories did not enjoy nearly this degree of sup-
port. Nevertheless, the general principles advanced in the Dred 
Scott majority opinions concerning the constitutional limits on 
federal power in the territories and the rights protected by the 
due process clause better reflect the main lines of antebellum ju-
risprudence than those advanced by many prominent contempo-
rary critics of Dred Scott. Once one concedes, as Lincoln and 
other influential opponents of slavery did, that American citizens 
had the right to bring their property into American territories, 
the historical and aspirational status of the Dred Scott decision 
becomes far more complicated than modern scholars realize. 
A. THE INSTITUTIONAL CRITIQUE 
Institutional critics of Dred Scott regard judicial review as ''a 
deviant institution in a democratic society." The judiciary is "a 
countermajoritarian force" in our system of government, Alexan-
der Bickel and other proponents of judicial restraint insist, be-
cause "when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a 
legislative act ... it thwarts the will of the representatives of the 
actual people of the here and now; it exercises control, not on 
behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it."46 This 
"countermajoritarian" label, however, does not fit Dred Scott. 
The Court's rulings on black citizenship and congressional power 
over slavery in the territories were consistent with the policy 
preferences of "the prevailing majority" before the Civil War. 
Indeed, "the prevailing [legislative] majority" in antebellum 
America did everything possible to secure a judicial ruling on the 
constitutional status of any ban on slavery in the territories. Had 
the Court decided Dred Scott on narrow grounds, that ruling 
would have "thwart[ ed] the will of the representatives of the ac-
tual people of the here and now."47 
44. James Kent, 2 Commentaries on American Law 282 (William Kent, 8th ed. 
1854). ("[N]egroes or other slaves, born within and under the allegiance of the United 
States are natural born subjects, but not citizens"). 
45. Senator James Scott of Pennsylvania in 1871 claimed that Marshall endorsed a 
manuscript which denied black citizenship. Cong. Globe, 42nd Cong., 1 Sess., 576 (1871). 
The director of the Marshall Papers, however, does not know whether the letter in ques-
tion actually exists. Phone conversation with Dr. Charles Hobson, February 6, 1997. 
46. Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the 
Bar of Politics 128, 16 (Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc.). 
47. Id. 
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Dred Scott is often depicted as a victory for the most ex-
treme proslavery fanatics in the United States,48 but that decision 
by and large merely proclaimed that the policies advanced by the 
dominant Jacksonian coalition were constitutionally correct. 
Both the slavery and citizenship prongs of the Taney Court's rul-
ing had recently been articulated by the Attorney General of the 
United States, and President Buchanan's third annual message 
vigorously endorsed the most southern interpretation of the 
Dred Scott opinions.49 The Taney Court's conclusion that Con-
gress could not ban slavery in the territories mirrored the victori-
ous Democratic Party's platform of 1856, a platform which stated 
that "under the Constitution" the federal government was obli-
gated to follow the policy of "non-interference ... with Slavery in 
State and Territory."so Democratic party platforms did not dis-
cuss black citizenship, but Democrats in power consistently 
treated free blacks as something less than full citizens. Taney as 
Attorney General explicitly declared in 1832 that descendants of 
free blacks could not become American citizens, and this policy 
was generally adopted by later Jacksonians in the executive 
branch of the national govemment.sl Exceptions were occasion-
ally made, but when Democratic officials explicitly considered 
48. See, e.g., Burt, 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 19-20 (cited in note 31). 
49. Caleb Cushing, Eminent Domain of the States-Equality of the States, 7 Op. 
Atty. Gen. 571 (1855) (Missouri Compromise unconstitutional); Cushing, 8 Op. Atty. 
Gen. at 139 (cited in note 43); James Buchanan, Third Annual Message in James D. Rich-
ardson, ed., 5 A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 554-55 (Gov-
ernment Printing Office, 1897). Franklin Pierce in his last annual message to Congress 
also denied federal power to prohibit slavery in the territories. Franklin Pierce, Fourth 
Annual Message, in Richardson, ed., 5 Messages and Papers 400-04. 
50. Democratic Platform of 1856, in Donald Bruce Johnson, ed., National Party Plat· 
forms: Volume 1, 1840-1956 at 25 (U. of Illinois Press, 1956). 
51. Swisher, Taney at 154 (cited in note 3); Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor, Free 
Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War 292 (Oxford U. Press, 
1970); William M. Wiecek, The Sources of Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760· 
1848 at 164-65 (Cornell U. Press, 1977). 
Justice William Johnson and the Monroe Administration did object to a South Caro-
lina law imprisoning any free black sailor whose ship was docked in a state port, but they 
did so primarily because they regarded such commercial measures as the exclusive pre-
serve of the federal government. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493, 494-96 
(C.C.D.S.C. 1823); William Wirt, Validity of South Carolina Police Bill, 1 Op. Atty. Gen. 
659 (1824); John Quincy Adams to Stratford Canning, June 17, 1823, quoted in Free 
Colored Seaman-Majority and Minority Reports, H.R. Report, 27 Cong., 3 Sess., No. 80 
(1843). That federal policy was overruled by Jackson's first Attorney General, John Mac-
Pherson Berrien. John MacPherson Berrien, Validity of South Carolina Police Bill, 2 Op. 
Atty. Gen. 426 (1831). A House Committee in 1843 concluded that similar laws imprison-
ing free seamen of color violated the privileges and immunities clause of Article IV. Free 
Colored Seaman, 2-4, but that report was never acted upon. 
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the question, they almost always ruled that free blacks were not 
eligible for citizenship.sz 
Virtually every community in antebellum America shared 
this hostile attitude toward black residents. Free black males 
were routinely denied rights typically identified with citizenship, 
and these political practices played a significant role in Taney's 
argument that slaves and their descendants could not become 
American citizens.s3 Eric Foner notes that "racial prejudice was 
all but universal in antebellum northern society." "Only five 
states, all in New England," he observes, "allowed the black man 
equal suffrage, and there he was confined to menial occupations 
and subjected to constant discrimination." Moreover, Foner 
adds, "[i]n the West, Negroes were often excluded from public 
schools, and four states-Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and Oregon, 
even barred them entering their territory."s4 Even mainstream 
Republicans were reluctant to criticize Taney's ruling on black 
citizenship. Abraham Lincoln during his debates with Stephen 
Douglas took pains to make clear that he "never ha[ d] com-
plained especially of the Dred Scott decision because it held that 
a negro could not be a citizen," and announced that he opposed 
making free blacks citizens of Illinois.ss Republican legislators in 
New York and Ohio who in the wake of Dred Scott did make a 
show of support for black citizenship were almost immediately 
voted out of office.s6 As the fate of those representatives who 
did challenge the unrelenting racism of Jacksonian political prac-
tice illustrates, Taney and his fellow justices did not impose a ju-
52. Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States, 1790-1860 at 31-
32, 53-56 (U. of Chicago Press, 1961). 
53. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407-16. The Curtis dissent, by comparison, 
merely pointed to a few isolated practices which suggested that in 17f!:7 or 1857 some 
blacks might have been American citizens. /d. at 573-76 (Curtis, J., dissenting). Of 
course, Curtis did not believe he had to demonstrate that most Americans thought free 
blacks were citizens of the United States. /d. at 571 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (claiming that 
the issue before that court was "whether any person of African descent, whose ancestors 
were sold as slaves in the United States, can be a citizen of the United States" [emphasis 
added]). The point is simply that even the dissents in Dred Scott implicitly recognized 
that the Taney Court's ruling on black citizenship, while perhaps constitutionally wrong, 
could not be described as countermajoritarian. 
54. Foner, Free Soil at 261 (cited in note 51). See Alexis De Tocqueville, in Phillips 
Bradley, ed., 1 Democracy in America 373-74, 382-83, 390 (Vintage Books, 1945); 
Litwack, North of Slavery at vii-viii, 3-112 (cited in note 52). 
55. Abraham Lincoln, Seventh and Last Debate With Stephan Douglas at Alton, Illi-
nois, in Lincoln, 3 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 283, 289-99, Roy P. Basler, 
ed., (Rutgers U. Press, 1953); Lincoln, Fourth Debate With Stephen A. Douglas at Charles-
ton, Illinois, in id. at 145, 179; see Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 436-37,439 (cited 
in note 24); David Herbert Donald, Lincoln 200 (Simon & Schuster, 1995); Litwack, 
North of Slavery at 62-63 (cited in note 52). 
56. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 432-36 (cited in note 24). 
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dicial solution to the question of black citizenship on a hostile 
Congress or nation. Rather, Fehrenbacher observes, "the Dred 
Scott decision, as it applied to free Negroes, had a majoritarian 
ring that transcended sectional lines. "57 
Indeed, Democrats from all regions of the country were fre-
quently effusive in their praise for the Court's handiwork on all 
the issues decided in Dred Scott. Southern Democrats, not sur-
prisingly, asserted that "[t]he decision is right and the argument 
unanswerable;" their northern brethren agreed that "resistance 
to that decision is ... resistance to the constitution-to the gov-
ernment-to the Union itself."5s Both Southern and Northern 
Democrats were particularly pleased that the justices had "at a 
single blow, shiver[ed] the anti-slavery platform of the late great 
Northern Republican party into atoms." The official newspaper 
of the Buchanan administration praised the "salutary influence" 
of the Taney Court's ruling and predicted that slavery would 
"cease to be a dangerous element in our political contests. "59 
Committed antislavery advocates ruefully admitted that Dred 
Scott was not countermajoritarian. "Judge Taney's decision, infa-
mous as it is," Susan B. Anthony acknowledged, "is but the re-
flection of the spirit and practice of the American people, North 
as well as South."60 Lincoln similarly recognized that the Taney 
Court was merely following the most recent voting returns. 
"[T]he Dred Scott decision," he observed, "never would have 
been made in its present form if the party that made it had not 
been sustained previously by the elections. "61 
Institutional theorists are clearly wrong when they maintain 
that "with the intrusion of the Court into the slavery issue, many 
felt that any compromise over slavery was now impossible."62 
History indicates that, rather than the decision that foreclosed 
compromise, Dred Scott was the direct result of the settlement 
that forces committed to compromise on slavery issues reached 
during the years immediately before the Civil War. The Demo-
crats were the party of accommodation in 1857, and by the early 
57. ld. at 430. 
58. Id. at 418-19 (quoting the Louisville Democrat, March 8, 1857, and the New 
Hampshire Patriot, March 18, 1857). See Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 427-28 
(cited in note 24); Charles Warren, 2 The Supreme Court in United States History: 1836-
1918 at 312-15 (Little, Brown, and Co., 1947). 
59. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 419-20 (cited in note 24) (quoting the 
New York Herald, March 8, 1857, and the Washington Union, March 6, 11, 12, 1857). 
60. Id. at 430 (quoting Susan B. Anthony). 
61. Lincoln, Fifth Debate With Stephen A. Douglas, at Galesburg, Jllinois, in Lincoln, 
Collected Works 207, 232 (cited in note 55). 
62. Ehrlich, Scott v. Sandford 761 (cited in note 4). 
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1850s leading members of that coalition had agreed among them-
selves that the Supreme Court should resolve whether territorial 
governments had the right to promote or forbid slavery. Promi-
nent Jacksonians (and moderate Whigs) in all regions of the 
country publicly declared that the federal judiciary was the insti-
tution responsible for determining the extent to which slavery 
could be regulated in the territories. President James K. Polk, 
Stephen Douglas, Jefferson Davis and Henry Clay were among 
the numerous antebellum political leaders who urged Congress 
"to leave the question of slavery or no slavery to be declared by 
the only competent authority that can definitely settle it forever, 
the authority of the Supreme Court."63 President-elect James 
Buchanan's inaugural address in 1857 explicitly declared that the 
status of slavery in the territories was "a judicial question, which 
legitimately belongs to the Supreme Court of the United 
States."64 Lest jurisdictional problems bar judicial review, Con-
gress after the Mexican War routinely inserted measures facilitat-
ing judicial action on any question concerning the status of 
slavery in the territories.6s Dred Scott, in other words, was "un-
dertaken only upon the explicit invitation of Congress" and the 
President.66 
These political pressures influenced several justices in the 
Dred Scott majority. Justice Wayne thought that "the peace and 
harmony of the country required the settlement" of the status of 
slavery in the territories "by judicial decision." Justice Campbell 
maintained that "the Court would not fulfil public expectation or 
discharge its duties by maintaining silence upon [that] ques-
tion."67 Northern Democrats, the alleged "victims"68 of Dred 
Scott, applauded the Taney Court's decision to issue a broad rul-
ing. "If the case had been disposed of [on narrow grounds]," Ste-
63. Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1 Sess., 1154-55 (speech of Henry Oay). See James K. 
Polk, Fourth Annual Message, in 4 Messages and Papers, 642; Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1 
Sess., App., 154 (speech of Jefferson Davis); Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 1 Sess., App., 797 
(speech of Steven Douglas). 
64. James Buchanan, Inaugural Address in Richardson, ed., 5 Messages and Papers 
at 431 (cited in note 49). 
65. 9 Stat. 450 (1850); 9 Stat. 455-456 (1850); 10 Stat. 280, 287 (1854). 
66. Wallace Mendelson, Dred Scon's Case-Reconsidered, 38 Minn. L. Rev. 16, 16 
(1953). For detailed accounts of legislative efforts to have the judiciary resolve contested 
issues over slavery, see Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scon Case at 152-208 (cited in note 24); 
Mendelson, 38 Minn. L. Rev. at 16; Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: 
Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, in 7 Studies in American Political Development 35, 
46-50 (1993). 
67. Dred Scon at 455 (Wayne, J., concurring); Samuel l)'ler, Memoir of Roger 
Brooke Taney, LL.D. 384 (John Murphy & Co., 1872) (quoting J.A. Campbell to Samuel 
Tyler, Nov. 24, 1870). 
68. Bernard Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court 124 (Oxford U. Press, 1993). 
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phen Douglas declared three months after the judicial decision 
had been handed down, "who can doubt ... the character of the 
denunciations which would have been hurled upon the devoted 
heads of those illustrious judges, with much more plausibility and 
show of fairness than they are now denounced for having decided 
the case ... upon its merits?"69 
Douglas praised the Taney Court because, unlike contempo-
rary institutionalists, he correctly recognized that most antebel-
lum Americans, indeed most antebellum northerners, could 
accept, if not endorse, a judicial ruling denying legislative power 
to regulate slavery in the territories. No one denies that Dred 
Scott played some role in aggravating the controversies responsi-
ble for the Civil War. Antislavery advocates in the North were 
outraged by what they feared was a conspiracy to make slavery a 
national institution;?o southerners were offended by northern re-
fusals to accept the judicial ruling.n Still, the historical evidence 
suggests that Dred Scott had none of the baneful consequences 
commonly attributed to that case. The decisions most responsi-
ble for the Civil War were made by those political actors institu-
tionalist dogma entrusts with the authority to compromise 
divisive political issues. 
Kenneth Stampp's meticulous study of American politics in 
1857 concludes that the Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott 
had no immediate influence on the body politic. "Taney's opin-
ion," he states, "however provocative, produced no concrete re-
sults."n The cause of union in 1857 depended on the continued 
vitality of the Democratic party as the vehicle for statesmen in-
terested in compromising the slavery issue, and Dred Scott did 
not weaken Democratic unity or strength. Indeed, the decision 
at first united Democrats, who shared a common hostility to free 
blacks and to federal regulation of slavery in the territories. Af-
ter suffering massive defections between 1854 and 1856 as a re-
sult of the Kansas-Nebraska Act,73 northern Democrats in state 
69. Id. (quoting Stephen Douglas). 
70. See Lincoln, 2 Collected Works at 452-453,461-67,521-23, 525-26,539-40, 550-53 
(cited in note 55); Abraham Lincoln in Robert W. Johannsen, ed., The Lincoln-Douglas 
Debates of 1858 at 56-67, 82-85, 110-14, 229-34 (Oxford U. Press, 1965); Lincoln, 3 Col-
lected Works at 78, 89-90,95,99-101, 349, 368-69,424-30,443-44,484,548-50, 553 (cited in 
note 55); Lincoln, 4 Collected Works at 29 (cited in note 55). See also Foner, Free Soil at 
97-98, 101 (cited in note 51); Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 437-38, 451-53, 457, 
464, 487-88, 493 (cited in note 24). 
71. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 450, 562 (cited in note 24). 
72. Kenneth M. Starnpp, America in 1857: A Nation on the Brink 109 (Oxford U. 
Press, 1990). See Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 437, 449 (cited in note 24). 
73. See Foner, Free Soil at 155-68, especially, 165 (cited in note 51). 
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elections held during the spring and fall following the Dred Scott 
decision recovered many offices previously held by Republi-
cans.74 Fehrenbacher's study of those voting returns finds "no 
evidence that Dred Scott manufactured votes for Republicans 
anywhere." "[I]t is difficult," he concludes, "to escape the im-
pression that the decision, if it helped anyone, helped the 
Democrats. "7s 
The event that "brought on a genuine uprising of northern 
rank-and-file Democrats" and ruined the party of accommoda-
tion was President Buchanan's decision in the late fall of 1857 to 
demand that Kansas be admitted as a slave state.76 Led by Ste-
phen Douglas, northern Democrats who had accepted the Dred 
Scott decision bitterly attacked the fraudulent proslavery 
Lecompton constitution. The resulting struggle between the 
Buchanan administration and anti-Lecompton Democrats de-
stroyed the fragile union between northern and southern Jack-
sonians, severely weakened Democratic party strength in the 
North, and paved the way for the Lincoln victory in 1860.77 In 
sharp contrast to contemporary commentators who think that the 
Dred Scott decision in the winter of 1857 made compromise over 
slavery nearly impossible, many Republicans living at that time 
thought that had Buchanan compromised and allowed a fair elec-
tion in Kansas on the Lecompton constitution, he would have 
destroyed the nascent Republican party and ensured Democratic 
electoral hegemony for the foreseeable future.7s Lincoln, in par-
ticular, was quite concerned that Republicans might support 
Douglas for the Senate in 1858 despite the latter's defense of 
Dred Scott because the Little Giant had successfully opposed the 
Buchanan administration on Lecompton.79 Indeed, Lincoln may 
have used Dred Scott in the debates less to convert Democrats 
74. See Stampp, America in 1857 at 102-04, 109 (cited in note 72); Fehrenbacher, 
The Dred Scott Case at 565-66 (cited in note 24). 
75. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 566 (cited in note 24). 
76. Stampp, America in 1857 at 330 (cited in note 72); Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott 
Case at 468, 563 (cited in note 24). 
77. See Stampp, America in 1857 at 309-16, 322-24, 329-30 (cited in note 72); 
Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 566 (cited in note 24). 
78. Stampp, America in 1857 at 309-10 (cited in note 72). But see id. at 330-31 
(claiming that "removing the Kansas question from national politics ... would not have 
assured a lasting settlement of the sectional conflict"). 
79. See Lincoln, 2 Collected Works at 443-44, 446-51, 455-57, 459, 467-69, 497-98, 
509-11 (cited in note 55); Foner, Free Soil at 132 (cited in note 51); Fehrenbacher, The 
Dred Scott Case at 486 (cited in note 24). 
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than to remind his partisans why Douglas was unacceptable to 
them.so 
The dramatically different impacts that Dred Scott and 
Lecompton had on Democratic party unity confound institution-
alist assertions that justices are less capable than elected officials 
of reaching socially acceptable compromises on contentious 
political issues. Judicial responses to slavery during the 1850s fa-
cilitated Democratic unity; the decisions which destroyed that co-
alition and then the nation were made by the President and his 
legislative supporters. Indeed, Dred Scott was so successful a 
political compromise from a northern perspective that Stephen 
Douglas and his political allies called on all parties to subsequent 
debates over slavery in the territories to again agree to facilitate 
and abide by future judicial rulings on that subject. Prominent 
Northern Democrats, Douglas assured the south, would accept 
territorial slave codes should those measures be explicitly man-
dated by a Supreme Court decision.s1 To be sure, Grier and 
maybe Nelson aside, no Taney Court justice attempted to resolve 
slavery issues in the way most likely to accommodate those polit-
ical actors crucial to the continued maintenance of the Union.sz 
Nevertheless, perhaps by a lucky accident, the actual decision 
handed down by the Court seems the best compromise available 
in 1857. Support for judicial decisions protecting slavery in the 
territories was the last concession that Northern Democrats 
could make to the South without losing their party strength in 
crucial midwestern states. 
Compromise in 1857 meant compromise that would enable 
the Democratic party to maintain its majority status. Southern 
disunionists were actively weaning their electorate from that 
Jacksonian coalition in order to prepare the way for secession.s3 
Northern Republicans were more interested in putting slavery on 
80. See Lincoln, Debates at 56-67, 83-85 (cited in note 70). See also Fehrenbacher, 
The Dred Scott Case at 487-88 (cited in note 24). 
81. Democratic Platform of 1860 in Donald Bruce Johnson and Kirk H. Porter, eds., 
National Party Platforms at 30-31 (cited in note 50). See Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott 
Case at 517, 534, 537-38 (cited in note 24). 
82. Grier does appear to have joined the Dred Scott majority, in part, because he 
thought having a Northern justice support the result would make that decision more ac-
ceptable to that region. See Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 311-12 (cited in note 
24) (quoting Grier to Buchanan, February 23, 1857). Nelson simply refused to discuss the 
larger issues discussed by the other justices. See footnote 27 above. 
83. See William W. Freehling, 1 Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854 at 
4-5, 316-19, 337-38, 357, 479-86, 490, 519-35 (Oxford U. Press, 1990). For southern threats 
to secede if demands were not met, see John C. Calhoun, 4 The Works of John C. Calhoun 
576 (D. Appleton and Company, Richard K. Cralle, ed., 1856). 
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the road to extinction than in preserving the union.84 Given the 
fundamental differences in the constitutional and political goals 
that divided Northern Republicans from Southern disunionists, 
no institution could have fashioned a slavery compromise that 
would have satisfied all Americans (even if persons of color are 
not counted as Americans ).ss Hence, whether Dred Scott was a 
reasonable compromise must be judged in light of that decision's 
impact on those forces committed to peaceful Union, and not on 
the reactions from partisans committed either to secession or to a 
set of policies that would risk secession. 
Judged by this standard, Dred Scott seems a successful com-
promise. Northern Democrats did not think every sentence of 
the majority opinions correct as a matter of constitutional logic, 
but they were willing to adhere to the Court's explicit ruling and 
even promised in advance to support any future ruling providing 
protection for slavery in the territories. This position proved po-
litically astute as Democrats in the wake of Dred Scott began 
regaining the votes necessary to assure their continued control of 
national politics. That a party almost destroyed by the legislative 
decision in 1854 to repeal a ban on slavery in territories north of 
the Missouri Compromise line was not adversely affected by the 
judicial decision three years later requiring slavery in those terri-
tories may seem puzzling. Several features of American politics 
during the late 1850s, however, may explain why Northern Dem-
ocrats were more easily able to digest Dred Scott than the Kan-
sas-Nebraska Act. 
Political debates over the status of slavery in the territories 
were really concerned with the eventual status of slavery in the 
states that would be fashioned from those territories. 
Northerners of all political persuasions sought to promote addi-
tional free states both because additional free states would facili-
84. See, i.e., Lincoln, 3 Collected Works at 454-55, 502, 542-43 (cited in note 55); 
Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 1 Sess., App., 479 (speech of Salmon Chase); Foner, Free Soil at 
138-44, 219-225 (cited in note 51). 
85. Suggestions that the Court should have simply kept the channels of debate over 
slavery open, Burt, 42 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 19 (cited in no~e 31), ~g the qu~sti~:m. 
One division between North and South was the extent to wh1ch antislavery ag~tatlon 
should be suppressed or punished by the states and federal governmen~. See. ~chael 
Kent Curtis, The 1859 Crisis Over Hinton Helper's Book, The Impendmg Cns1s: Free 
Speech, Slavery, and Some Light on the Meaning of the First Section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1113 (1993); Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History 
of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835-37, 89 Nw. U. L. 
Rev. 785 (1995). 
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tate northern control of the national government86 and because 
they believed free white labor could not compete with slave 
black labor. As William Freehling notes, "calling slave labor det-
rimental to increased labor" was "the most lethal argument 
against slavery in labor-starved, development-crazed America."s? 
Governor Alexander Randall of Wisconsin spoke for most 
northerners when he insisted that "[f]ree labor languishes and 
becomes degrading when put in competition with slave labor 
.••• "88 
Although the status of slavery in future states was the over-
riding concern of most antebellum Americans, debate focused on 
the status of slavery in the territories because all parties per-
ceived a close connection between territorial and state policy. 
"To opponents and defenders of slavery alike," Arthur Bestor 
points out, "it seemed clear that the first decisions made in the 
territories would be the determining ones." Antebellum Ameri-
cans, he notes, feared that, "[l]ong before a state attained full 
standing, its social system could have been irrevocably fixed by 
decisions already made." Lincoln asserted that "[t]he first few 
may get slavery IN, and the subsequent many cannot easily get it 
OUT." Another antislavery advocate observed that "if we are 
wrong on the subject of slavery, it can never be righted."s9 
These fears seemed warranted during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Every territory which allowed slavery had 
become a slave state. Illinois almost became a slave state despite 
the Northwest Ordinance. More than forty percent of state vot-
ers in 1824 supported a referendum which would have led to the 
legalization of human bondage. "[O]nly law," Freehling con-
86. See Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 1 Sess., 521 (speech of William H. Seward) ("[w]e 
are fighting for a majority of free states"); Parke Godwin, Political Essays 286 (Dix, Ed-
wards & Co., 1856); Foner, Free Soil at 58, 222, 236 (cited in note 51). 
87. Freehling, Road to Disunion at 203 (cited in note 83). See Foner, Free Soil at 11-
72 (cited in note 51); Alison Goodyear Freehling, Drift Toward Dissolution: The Virginia 
Slavery Debate of 1831-1832 at 145-47, 174-77, 211, 222-23, 243-45 (Louisiana State U. 
Press, 1982). 
88. Foner, Free Soil at 57 (cited in note 51) (quoting Alexander W. Randall). For an 
antislavery argument that highlighted the baneful influence of slave labor on free white 
labor, see Henry Ruffner, Address to the People of West Virginia (R.C. Noel, 1847). See 
also, Jesse Burton Harrison, Review of the Slave Question 10 (T.W. White, 1833). 
89. Arthur Bestor, State Sovereignty and Slavery: A Reinterpretation of Pros/avery 
Constitutional Doctrine, 1846-1860, J. of the Ill. St. Hist. Soc. 117, 150 (1961); Lincoln, 2 
Collected Works at 268 (cited in note 55); Foner, Free Soil at 55 (cited in note 51) (quoting 
General James Nye). See Lincoln, Debates at 147 ("[i]t takes not only law but the en-
forcement of law to keep [slavery] out. That is the history of this country upon the sub-
ject") (cited in note 70); Lincoln, 3 Collected Works at 483, 485-86,499 (cited in note 55); 
Foner, Free Soil at 54, 56 (cited in note 51); Parke Godwin, Political Essays at 286-89 
(cited in note 86). 
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eludes, "stopped slavery from entering midwestern latitudes."90 
Hence, when the Kansas-Nebraska law was enacted, most 
northerners had good reason to believe that, by permitting slav-
ery in Kansas and other territories, Congress had ensured that 
those regions would maintain that institution upon admission to 
the Union. Lincoln in 1855 thought it an "already settled ques-
tion" that Kansas would join the Union as a slave state.9t 
Developments after the Kansas-Nebraska Act challenged 
this axiom of American territorial politics. By the time Dred 
Scott was decided, the majority of Kansans seemed committed to 
banning slavery upon admission to the Union. Moreover, slavery 
was not taking hold in Nebraska and in other territories where 
that practice was permitted by legislation or judicial decree. 
Slavery was legal in the New Mexico and Utah territories, but 
there do not seem to have been more than 100 slaves in both 
jurisdictions.92 "The whole controversy over the Territories," 
cooler heads were recognizing by 1860, "related to an imaginary 
negro in an impossible place. "93 
The apparent strength of free soil interests in territories 
where slavery was nominally permitted seems responsible for a 
shift in the priorities of many Northern Democrats during the 
years between Kansas-Nebraska and Dred Scott. Whether slav-
ery was legal in the territory of Kansas became less vital an issue 
to persons who were becoming more confident that slavery 
would shortly be illegal in the state of Kansas. Once the issue of 
slavery at statehood was practically divorced from the issue of 
slavery in the territorial stage, a sufficient number of northerners 
could accept southern demands that slavery be allowed in the 
territories to maintain the hegemony of the Democrats in na-
tional politics. Even Republicans upon taking power in 1860 ex-
pressed little interest in regulating human bondage in territories 
where that institution was not thriving.94 Lecompton was an 
abomination to Democrats who tolerated Dred Scott because 
northerners could not accept southern demands that Kansas be-
90. Freehling, Road to Disunion at 139 (cited in note 83). See PeterS. Onuf, State-
hood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance 123-30 (Indiana U. Press, 1987); 
Finkelman, Slavery at 36, 77-78 (cited in note 40); Lincoln, 2 Collected Works 276-77 
(cited in note 55); Lincoln, 3 Collected Works 437, 454-57, 466-68 (cited in note 55). For 
southern concerns that no territory where slavery was banned would become a slave 
state, see Cong. Globe, 36th Cong., 1 Sess,. App., 77 (speech of James Green). 
91. Lincoln, 2 Collected Works at 321 (cited in note 55). 
92. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 175-77 (cited in note 24). 
93. James G. Blaine, 1 Twenty Years of Congress: From Lincoln to Garfield 272 
(Henry Bill Publishing Co., 1884). 
94. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 548 (cited in note 24). 
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come a slave state despite what seemed to be the presence of a 
clear antislavery majority. Democrats could concede this issue, 
Stephen Douglas and his political allies realized, only at the cost 
of becoming the permanent minority party in the North. Fight-
ing Lecompton, the Little Giant and others knew, was "the only 
course that could save the Northern Democracy from annihila-
tion at the next election. "9s 
Popular support for the Court as an institution also helped 
Dred Scott unite the Democratic party. Contemporary students 
of public law observe that judicial decisions often provide suffi-
cient cover for political actors who cannot advocate certain poli-
cies directly.% Just as many politicians who would not vote to 
repeal bans on abortion have nevertheless insisted that the 
Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade be obeyed,97 so North-
ern Democrats who might not have been able to vote for meas-
ures repealing the Missouri Compromise or making slavery legal 
in all territories could nevertheless support a Supreme Court de-
cision to that effect. Northern Democrats could not tolerate a 
fraudulent slave state under any circumstances. They could, 
however, support southern pretensions in the territories as long 
as they could do so indirectly by supporting a judicial decision 
rather than by expressing direct support for the policy. Thus, 
bald institutional assertions to the contrary, Dred Scott may not 
only have been the best compromise available in 1857, but the 
federal judiciary may have been the only institution capable of 
reaching that accommodation. 
B. THE HISTORICAL CRITIQUE 
Claims that Dred Scott would have been decided otherwise 
had Taney and his fellow justices adopted historicist methods of 
constitutional interpretation are belied by the Dred Scott opin-
ions and constitutional history. Taney and his fellow justices ex-
plicitly declared that their arguments were faithful to the original 
intentions of the framers and to judicial precedent. Much histori-
cal evidence supports the Taney Court's conclusion that freed 
slaves could not become American citizens and that Congress 
had no power to ban slavery in the territories. Significant 
problems exist with important historical claims made in the rna-
95. Id. at 466 (quoting C. Goody to Douglas, December 20, 1857), 464-67, 511. 
96. Graber, Nonmajoritarian Difficulty at 42-43 (cited in note 66); Gerald N. Rosen-
berg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change? 33-36 (U. of Chicago 
Press, 1991 ). 
97. Graber, Nonmajoritarian Difficulty at 56-59 (cited in note 66). 
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jority opinions, but the Curtis and McLean dissents also relied on 
historically questionable propositions. At the very least, contem-
porary commentators ought to hesitate before damning on 
originalist grounds judicial opinions that cite chapter and verse a 
letter written by James Madison, which clearly supports the jus-
tices' most significant conclusion. 
On the surface, the opinion of the Court in Dred Scott seems 
"a riot of originalism."9s Taney's crucial interpretive passage de-
clared that the Constitution "must be construed now as it was 
understood at the time of its adoption." The Constitution, Taney 
wrote, "speaks not only in the same words, but with the same 
meaning and intent with which it spoke when it came from the 
hands of its framers, and was voted on and adopted by the peo-
ple of the United States."99 The three justices who wrote lengthy 
opinions supporting the holding of Dred Scott similarly relied on 
originalist premises and discussed the Constitution's history at 
length. Justice Campbell concluded that a congressional right to 
ban slavery in the territories "is not supported by the historical 
evidence drawn from the Revolution, the Confederation, or the 
deliberations which preceded the ratification of the Federal Con-
stitution." Justice Daniel's opinion quoted extensively from a 
letter James Madison wrote in 1819 which asserted that the fram-
ers had not vested Congress with any power to regulate slavery 
in the territories.too These affirmations of historicism seem to 
have been made in good faith. Some rhetoric in the majority 
opinions is forced and historically dubious, but on the whole, Ta-
ney, Daniel, Catron, and Campbell presented a reasonable inter-
pretation of the original Constitution and subsequent legal 
developments. 
1. Citizenship 
Commentators have universally condemned Taney's claim 
that "neither the class of persons who had been imported as 
slaves, nor their descendants" could be citizens of the United 
States.101 Conventional wisdom maintains that the dissents in 
98. Eisgruber, 10 Const Cornm. at 46 (cited in note 7). 
99. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 426. See Roger Brooke Taney, Memoir of 
Roger Brooke Taney, LL.D. 602 (Samuel TYler, ed. John Murphy & Co., 1872). In Ta-
ney's view, the critics of his opinion were the parties guilty of "act(ing] upon the principle 
that the end will justify the means." I d. at 608. 
100. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 512 (opinion of Campbell, J.); id. at 491-92 
(opinion of Daniel, J.) (quoting Madison to Robert Walsh, Nov. 27, 1819). See id. at 502-
07, 510-12 (opinion of Campbell, J.); 521-22, 526 (opinion of Catron, J.). 
101. I d. at 407. 
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Dred Scott devastated this proposition by pointing out that some 
blacks voted in 1787, and hence must have been citizens of the 
states where they resided.102 Eager to demonstrate the mendac-
ity of the Court's opinion, historians fail to discuss Taney's rebut-
tal of that criticism. As the Chief Justice pointed out, the 
franchise in many jurisdictions was not restricted to citizens. "A 
person," Taney stated, 
may be entitled to vote by the law of the State, who is not a 
citizen even of the State itself. And in some of the States of 
the Union foreigners not naturalized are allowed to vote. And 
the State may give the right to free negroes and mulattoes, but 
that does not make them citizens of the State, and still less of 
the United States.l03 
Abraham Lincoln, his Attorney General, Edward Bates, and 
other prominent northerners agreed. "[S]uffrage and eligibility 
have no necessary connection with citizenship," Bates declared 
in 1862. In his experience, "the one may, and often does, exist 
without the other."104 
Suffrage did not entail citizenship, Taney (and Stephen 
Douglas in his debates with Lincoln) correctly noted, because 
even if free blacks had no rights white citizens were obligated to 
respect, white citizens could at their discretion grant free blacks 
certain legal privileges.ws Free blacks, an influential Virginian 
noted, had "many legal rights and privileges in Virginia, but no 
constitutional ones. "106 Many framers maintained that the basic 
rights free blacks enjoyed as human beings did not entitle them 
to the distinctive rights of Americans. As Herbert Storing notes, 
"to concede the Negro's right to freedom is not to concede his 
right to U.S. citizenship."1o1 Jefferson, for example, firmly be-
102. Id. at 531, 533, 537 (McLean, J., dissenting), 572-76, 581-82 (Curtis, J., dissent-
ing). See also, Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 406-07 (cited in note 24). 
103. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 422, 405. See also, James H. Kettner, The 
Development of American Citizenship, 1608-1870 at 121 (U. of North Carolina Press, 
1978) (noting the prevalence of alien voting before the American Revolution). 
104. Edward Bates, Citizenship, 10 Op. Atty. Gen. 382, 408 (1962). See Lincoln, 2 
Collected Works at 355 (cited in note 55); Caleb Cushing, Relation of Indians to Citizen-
ship, 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 746 (1856). 
105. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 405,412-13, 426; Douglas, Debates at 33, 46-48, 
128-29, 216, 299-300 (cited in note 70). See Leech v. Cooley, 14 Miss. (6 Smedes & Mar-
shall) 93, 99 (Miss. 1846); Heirn v. Bridault, 37 Miss. 209, 224 (1859); Hardcastle Ads. 
Porcher, 1 Harper 495, 498-99 (S. Ct. App. 1826). 
106. Freehling, Drift Toward Dissolution at 180 (cited in note 87) (quoting William 
Henry Brodnax). 
. 107. Herbert J. Storing, Slavery and the Moral Foundations of the American Republic, 
m Robert A. Goldwin and Art Kaufman, eds., Slavery and Its Consequences: The Consti-
tution, Equality, and Race 59 (American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
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lieved that black and white persons were created equal, but could 
not inhabit the same civic space.1os These common distinctions 
between human, statutory, and citizenship rights explain why Ta-
ney and others did not regard the mere existence of free blacks 
with certain statutory liberties as warranting a judicial decision 
declaring Dred Scott an American. The citizenship issue before 
the justices depended on whether the liberties persons of color 
enjoyed in 1787 and afterwards were best conceptualized as the 
rights of citizens or mere exercises of communal grace. 
Once the question is phrased this way, the claim that slaves 
and their descendants could not become United States citizens 
seems more compelling. As Taney demonstrated, the severe 
legal disabilities free blacks suffered in every region of the 
United States at the time of ratification and afterwards indicated 
that no community considered black residents to be equal citi-
zens.109 Taney observed, for example, that in New Hampshire, 
the most antislavery state in the Union at the time of ratification, 
only "free white citizens" could be "enrolled in the militia of the 
State." In his opinion, the reason "the African race, born in the 
State [were] not permitted to share in one of the highest duties of 
the citizen" was "obvious:" "[h]e forms no part of the sovereignty 
of the State, and is not therefore called on to uphold and defend 
it."no Moreover, northern states may have granted free blacks 
rights only because persons of color were too few in number to 
be of any consequence. "Mark Anthony," during the Massachu-
setts ratification debates opposed incorporating more antislavery 
provisions into the constitution because "great numbers of slaves 
becoming citizens, might be burdensome and dangerous to the 
Public." For this reason, perhaps, the New York legislature in 
1785 combined a proposal to emancipate slaves with a measure 
to disenfranchise free blacks.111 
Claims that the disabilities suffered by women (universally 
recognized as citizens) were analogous to those of free blacksn2 
1988). See Lincoln, 3 Collected Works at 328 (cited in note 55); St. George Thcker, A 
Dissertation on Slavery: With a Proposal for the Gradual Abolition of it in the State of 
Virginia 86-87 (Printed for Mathew Carey, 1796). 
108. See Storing, Slavery at 50-51,58 (cited in note 107); see also notes 202-04, below, 
and the relevant text. 
109. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 412-16. 
110. Id. at 415. 
111. Mark Anthony, Boston Independent Chronicle, January 10, 1788, in John Kamin-
ski, ed., A Necessary Evil?: Slavery and the Debate Over the Constitution 83 (Madison 
House, 1995); Objections of the Council of Revision of the Gradual Abolition Bill, March 
21, 1785, in Kaminski, ed., A Necessary Evil? at 31. 
112. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 583 (Curtis, J., dissenting); Fehrenbacher, 
The Dred Scott Case at 343 (cited in note 24). 
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fail to grasp the fundamental difference in the perceived status of 
these groups. Although women lacked basic political rights, re-
publican theory at the founding maintained that females were 
virtually and adequately represented by the males in their family. 
"It is true," the Kentucky Supreme Court noted in an opinion 
denying black citizenship, 
that females and infants do not personally possess those rights 
and privileges [of citizenship], in any state in the Union; but 
they are generally dependent upon adult males, through 
whom they enjoy the benefits of those rights and privileges; 
and it is a rule of common law, as well as of common sense, 
that females and infants should, in this respect, partake of the 
quality of those adult males who belong to the same class and 
condition in society.u3 
In sharp contrast to infants and women, no claim was made that 
anyone virtually represented free blacks. Moreover, the preva-
lent doctrine of separate spheres assigned women important civic 
duties in private life, namely the bearing and rearing of offspring. 
As Rogers Smith has noted, women "lack[ ed] any power to par-
ticipate politically themselves, but [were] charged with conveying 
political morality to children in the domestic sphere. "114 By com-
parison, persons of color had no distinct civic responsibilities that 
might explain their legal disabilities. Free blacks were denied the 
opportunity to exercise most civic duties because they were 
thought unfit to be citizens, not because they were regarded as 
having some special contribution to make to the polity that was 
inconsistent with their exercising basic political rights.us 
Taney was wrong both when he asserted that free blacks had 
"never been regarded as a part of the people or citizens of the 
State," and when he referred to "the public opinion and laws 
which universally prevailed in the Colonies when the Declaration 
of Independence was framed, and when the Constitution was 
adopted" (emphasis added).u6 The Curtis dissent presented 
much evidence that some black residents of northern states were 
treated as citizens after the Revolution, and a Massachusetts 
court decision in 1783 apparently affirmed the citizenship of free 
blacks in that commonwealth.u7 Still, the issue before the Taney 
113. Amy v. Smith, 11 Ken. 326, 333-34 (1822). 
114. Rogers M. Smith, 'One United People': Second-Class Female Citizenship and the 
American Quest for Community, 1 Yale J.L. & Hum. 229, 255 (1989). 
115. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 416. 
116. ld. at 412; Taney, Memoir at 602 (cited in note 99). 
117. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 572-76 (Curtis, J., dissenting); Kettner, Ameri-
can Citizenship at 315 (cited in note 103) (discussing Commonwealth v. Jennison). See 
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Court did not depend on whether any free blacks were state citi-
zens before 1787, but on whether the persons responsible for the 
Constitution were aware of and intended to sanction black citi-
zenship. If the average ratifier of the Constitution thought, per-
haps erroneously, that free blacks were everywhere in the United 
States regarded as unfit for citizenship, then the mere existence 
of a few black citizens in 1787 could not change the original un-
derstanding of the Constitution. The Dred Scott holding on black 
citizenship is sound if, as Taney noted in 1858, "[t]he few persons 
who, in certain localities, have endeavored to obliterate the line 
of division, and to amalgamate the races, are hardly sufficient in 
number or in weight of character to be noticed as an exception to 
the overwhelming current [or even majority] of public opinion 
and feeling upon this subject."us 
The framers did not clearly define the status of free blacks. 
Some historians claim that Chief Justice Taney's analysis of black 
citizenship "was a fair description of the constitutional world of 
1787 at both the federal and the state levels."H9 Certainly, most 
southern framers agreed with Charles Pinckney's claim that in 
1787 "there did not then exist such a thing in the Union as a 
black or colored citizen."12o The famous passage in Virginia's 
Declaration of Rights, "all men are by nature equally free and 
independent, and have certain inherent rights," was followed by 
a proviso, "of which when they enter into a state of society," that 
was commonly understood as excluding persons of color from 
the liberties enjoyed by Virginia citizens.m Paul Finkelman 
makes a different argument, claiming that "there was no single 
'intention' of the framers of the 1787 Constitution" on the ques-
tion of black citizenship. "[T]he framers and ratifiers from the 
two sections," he suggests, "intended opposite meanings when 
they endorsed the new Constituti0n."122 If this is the case, then 
an originalist would have to conclude that no party to the dispute 
also John Lowell and Horace Gray, A Legal Review of the Case of Dred Scott, as Decided 
by the Supreme Court of the United States, 15-16 (Crosby, Nichols, and Company, 1857). 
118. Taney, Memoir at 601 (cited in note 99). 
119. William M. Wiecek, "The Blessings of Liberty": Slavery in the American Consti-
tutional Order in Goldwin and Kaufman, eds., Slavery and Its Consequences at 28 (cited in 
note 107). 
120. Annals of Congress, 16th Cong., 2 Sess., 1134 (speech by Charles Pinckney). 
121. A.E. Dick Howard, 1 Commentaries on the Constitution of Vvginia 62 (U. Press 
of Virginia, 1974). See Aldridge v. The Commonwealth, 4 Vir. (2 Va. Cas.) 447, 449 
(1824). 
122. Paul Finkelman, The ConstilutWn and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits 
of Historical Analysis, 50 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 349, 392, 385. See Kettner, American Citizen-
ship at 231-32 (cited in note 103). For Northern framers who assumed that free blacks 
were citizens, see Anthony, Boston Independent Chronicle at 83 (cited in note 111); Mas-
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over the citizenship status of former slaves had the better of the 
historical argument in Dred Scott. 
James Kettner aptly summarized the central problem with 
both the Taney opinion and Curtis dissent when he notes that 
"[f]ree [n]egroes appeared to occupy a middle ground in terms of 
the rights they were allowed to claim in practice, a status that 
could n.ot be described in the traditional language of slave, alien, 
or citizen."123 Forced to fit free blacks into one of these tradi-
tional categories, both Curtis and Taney had to suppress part of 
the historical record. Curtis was on strong ground when he noted 
that, contrary to Taney's assertions, some states had explicitly de-
clared free blacks to be citizens. Nevertheless, in order to ex-
plain away the disabilities that free blacks suffered, Curtis took 
the position that "naked citizenship" conferred no rights whatso-
evef.124 This conclusion is flatly inconsistent with the American 
law of citizenship at the time.12s Taney's claim that free blacks 
were best regarded as "subjects,"126 by comparison, seems a 
more accurate, if still imperfect, description of the actual legal 
status persons of color enjoyed at most times and places in ante-
bellum America. 
The limited federal case law on citizenship existing at the 
time Dred Scott was decided also supports the Taney Court's con-
clusion. No previous case explicitly discussed who was eligible 
for American citizenship, but the Court in Moore v. Illinois did 
indicate that states had the power to prohibit liberated slaves 
from entering their territory.127 This decision seems to imply that 
such persons were not constitutional citizens. It is difficult to im-
agine how the citizens of each state would be entitled to "the 
privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states" 
were states entitled to bar some citizens entirely.12s Should pre-
vious executive and state court opinions count as valid prece-
dents, the historical support for the Taney Court's ruling on 
citizenship becomes overwhelming. As noted above, virtually 
sachusetts Ratification Convention Debates, in Kaminski, ed., A Necessary Evil? at 87 
(cited in note 111) (quoting Thomas Dawes). 
123. Kettner, American Citizenship at 319 (cited in note 103). 
124. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 583-84 (Curtis, J., dissenting). For a similar 
claim, see Bates, Citizenship, 10 Op. Atty. Gen. at 382 (cited in note 104). 
125. See Kettner, American Citizenship at 235, 260, 311-12, 319 (cited in note 103). 
126. Taney, Memoir at 605-06 (cited in note 99). See Shaw v. Brown, 35 Miss. 246, 
315 (1858); Kent, 2 Commentaries at 282 (cited in note 44). 
127. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 18 (1852). 
128. The Moore opinion also indicated that states could bar paupers. See id. at 18. 
Paupers, however, could qualify for entry by becoming self-sufficient. Persons of color, 
by comparison, could never possess the qualities necessary for citizenship. See Amy, 11 
Ken. at 333-34. 
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every state court and United States Attorney General who con-
sidered the issue before 1857 concluded that free blacks were not 
citizens,tz9 Lincoln could offer no response in their sixth debate 
when Douglas asserted "(w)hat court or judge ever held that a 
negro was a citizen?" "The State courts had decided that ques-
tion over and over again," Douglas continued, "and the Dred 
Scott decision on that point only affirmed what every court in the 
land knew to be the law. "130 
Taney and Daniel also presented an historical argument that 
supports the more modest claim that slaves freed after 1787 
could not be or become United States citizens no matter what 
their status was in state law. The naturalization power granted to 
Congress in Article I, Section 8, both justices declared, was ex-
clusive. In their view, persons who were not citizens of the 
United States in 1787 or descended from such citizens could be-
come United States citizens only pursuant to an act of Congress. 
Thus, the Chief Justice and his associate from Virginia main-
tained that masters could not create American citizens by freeing 
their slaves, and states could not create American citizens by 
granting state citizenship to free blacks.m 
This interpretation of Article I, Section 8 has strong histori-
cal support. Alexander Hamilton in Federalist 32 stated that the 
naturalization power was exclusive, and subsequent Supreme 
Court decisions adopted his position.132 Even Justices Curtis and 
McLean conceded that states could not grant American citizen-
ship to foreign-born aliens,133 Without citing any historical evi-
dence, however, the dissenters maintained that the naturalization 
power did not encompass persons born on American soil. "[T]he 
Constitution," Curtis asserted, "has recognized the general prin-
ciple of public law, that allegiance and citizenship depend on the 
place of birth. "134 McLean maintained that native-born slaves 
129. See notes 42-43, above. 
130. Douglas, Debates at 268 (cited in note 70). 
131. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 405-06, 417-20; id. at 481-82 (Daniel, J., concur-
ring). For similar claims, see Cushing, Relation, 10 Op. Atty. Gen. at 746 (cited in note 
104); Thcker, A Dissenation on Slavery at 73 (cited in note 107) ("slaves emancipated may 
be taken in execution to satisfy any debt contracted by the person emancipating them"); 
Heim v. Bridault, 37 Miss. 209, 233 (1859) (act of manumission cannot create a state 
citizen); Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 201-02 (1853) (same). 
132. Federalist 32 (Hamilton) in Clinton Rossiter, ed., The Federalist Papers 199 
(New American Library, 1961); Thurlow v. Massachusetts, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 585-86 
(1847); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259,269 (1817). See United States v. Vulato, 2 
U.S. (2 Dallas) 370, 371-72 (1797). 
133. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 578 (Curtis, J., dissenting), 533 (McLean, J., 
dissenting). 
134. ld. at 581 (Curtis, J., dissenting); see id. at 531 (McLean, J., dissenting). 
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became United States citizens immediately upon gaining their 
freedom.Bs Curtis, by comparison, declared that persons born in 
the United States were United States citizens only if they were 
recognized as citizens in the state of their birth.136 No other state 
or the federal government could grant American citizenship to 
persons who were not citizens at birth.137 For all practical pur-
poses, this position entailed that in 1857 no person of color born 
outside of New England could enjoy any American citizenship 
right. Thus, the celebrated Curtis dissent seems based entirely on 
a pleading error. McLean might have been the only dissenter 
had Sandford merely insisted in the lower federal court that no 
former slave (or person of color born in Missouri) could acquire 
American citizenship. 
Taney may have been wrong when he insisted that "naturali-
zation" was "confined to persons born in a foreign county."13s 
Nevertheless, even if the national government had the power to 
grant citizenship to former slaves, that power was never exer-
cised before the Civil War. The First Congress, Taney pointed 
out, "confine[d] the right of becoming citizens 'to aliens being 
free white persons'," and that restriction was retained in subse-
quent legislation.139 Hence, to the extent that history and prece-
dent supported an exclusive federal naturalization power, no 
person whose ancestors were American slaves in 1787 could have 
been an American citizen in 1857. 
Daniel and Taney also overreached when they claimed "that 
the African negro race never have been acknowledged as belong-
ing to the family of nations."140 Many Americans living in 1787, 
Jefferson in particular, believed that black persons "were created 
equal" and were "endowed by their Creator with certain inalien-
able rights. "141 The denial of black citizenship in Dred Scott does 
not, however, depend on Taney's ahistorical reading of the Dec-
laration of Independence. The Taney/Daniel argument is true to 
135. Id. at 531 (McLean, J., dissenting). For a similar defense of birthright citizen-
ship, see Bates, Citizenship, 10 Op. Atty. Gen. at 382 (cited in note 104). If the McLean 
interpretation of birthright citizenship is taken literally, whether a slave became a citizen 
after manumission depended on whether that slave was born in the United States or im-
ported from abroad. 
136. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 582-86 (Curtis, J., dissenting). See Earl M. 
Maltz, The Unlikely Hero of Dred Scott: Benjamin Cunis and the Constitutional Law of 
Slavery, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 1995, 2009-11 (1996). 
137. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 585-86 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
138. Id. at 417. 
139. ld. at 419, 482 (Daniel, J., concurring). 
140. Id. at 475 (Daniel, J., concurring), 404-08 (opinion of the Court). 
141. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, in Merrill D. Peterson, 
ed., The Ponable Thomas Jefferson 215 (Penguin Books, 1975). 
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the framers and subsequent legal developments as long as "the 
African race [had not] been acknowledged as belonging to the 
[American] family."t42 This claim that people of different races 
could not occupy the same civic space was frequently made dur-
ing the founding era and was accepted by most white Americans 
during the 185Qs.t43 When combined with federal naturalization 
policies that had always excluded black persons, the persistent 
strand of white nationalism in American politics provides strong 
historical support for Taney's claim that Dred Scott could not be 
or become a citizen of the United States. 
2. Slavery in the Territories 
The Dred Scott majority also made a plausible case that a 
federal ban on slavery in the territories was inconsistent with the 
original understanding of the Constitution and subsequent doc-
trinal developments. Taney, Daniel, Campbell, and Catron de-
rived this constraint on congressional authority from the general 
constitutional principle that all exercises of legislative power are 
subject to strict limits. Given the framers' commitment to limited 
government, these justices reasoned, the Constitution could not 
have been intended to vest Congress with "supreme and irre-
sponsible power ... over boundless territories." After surveying 
at length the founders' hostility to absolutism of any kind, Justice 
Campbell declared that he sought "in vain for an annunciation 
that a consolidated power had been inaugurated ... which had 
no restriction but the discretion of Congress. "144 The national 
government, Taney agreed, "cannot, when it enters a Territory of 
the United States, put off its character, and assume discretionary 
or despotic powers which the Constitution has denied to it."t4s 
The justices in the Dred Scott majority maintained that fed-
eral restrictions on slavery in the territories violated several sig-
nificant constitutional principles. Constitutional history and 
precedent, Taney and Campbell asserted, forbade Congress from 
distinguishing between slaves and other possessions. In their 
view, although the national government had been given exten-
sive power to protect property, the framers vested Congress with 
no power to define property. Campbell declared that 
142. See Eisgruber, 10 Const. Comrn. at 48 (cited in note 7). 
143. See Jefferson, Notes at 186 (cited in note 141); Reginald Horsman, Race and 
Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism (Harvard U. Press, 
1981); George M. Fredrickson, The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-
American Character and Destiny, 1817-1914 at 1-164 (Harper & Row, 1971). 
144. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 511, 505 (Campbell, J., concurring). 
145. Id. at 449, 447. 
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"[w]hatever [state] Constitutions and laws validly determine to 
be property, ... the Federal Government ... [had] to recognize 
to be property."I46 "[T]he Constitution," the Chief Justice simi-
larly wrote, "recognizes the right of property of the master in a 
slave, and makes no distinction between that description of prop-
erty and other property owned by a citizen." Hence, he contin-
ued, "no tribunal acting under the authority of the United States 
... has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to [slavery] the 
benefit of the provisions and guarantees which have been pro-
vided for the protection of private property against the encroach-
ments of the Government."I47 
Laws banning slavery in the territories, Taney, Daniel and 
Catron insisted, were particularly egregious violations of prop-
erty rights because such measures unconstitutionally gave one 
class of citizens the right to the exclusive use of jointly owned 
American possessions. Territories, Taney asserted, were "ac-
quired by the General Government, as the representative and 
trustee of the people of the United States, and ... must therefore 
be held in that character for their common and equal benefit." 
Justice Daniel's concurring opinion reached the same conclusion. 
Congress, he maintained, could not by banning slavery in the ter-
ritories "bestow upon a portion of the citizens of this nation that 
which is the common property and privilege of all."I48 
These limits on federal power had a more substantial legal 
heritage and greater popular support than contemporary his-
toricists admit. The "right to enjoy the territory as equals"I49 was 
closely related to the more general animus towards class legisla-
tion that was central to early American constitutional thinking. 
As Howard Gillman and others have demonstrated, the framers 
of the Constitution as well as antebellum jurists believed that 
"equality ... ought to be the basis of every law," that govern-
ment should not pass laws that "subject 'some to peculiar bur-
dens' or grant 'to others peculiar exemptions.' "I so This notion 
that unequal laws violated due process was clearly articulated by 
Daniel Webster in the Dartmouth College case and was a staple 
146. Id. at 515 (Campbell, J., concurring). 
147. Id. at 451. 
148. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 448, 488 (Daniel, J., concurring). 
149. Id. at 527 (Catron, J., concurring). 
150. Marvin Myers, ed., James Madison, The Mind of the Founder: Sources of the 
Political Thought of James Madison 10-11 (The Hobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1973); Howard 
Gillman, The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers 
Jurisprudence 29 (Duke U. Press, 1993). 
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of Jacksonian era state judicial rhetoric.1s1 Long before he sat on 
the Supreme Court, Justice Catron, in a very influential opinion, 
defined "the law of the land" as "a general public law, equally 
binding upon every member of the community."1s2 Thus, from 
the perspective of the Southern Jacksonians on the Supreme 
Court, laws banning slavery in the territories looked suspiciously 
like the special privileges that, according to state court precedent 
and their inherited tradition, violated the first principle of due 
process.Is3 Sidney George Fisher, a leading Philadelphia jurist, 
endorsed this sentiment in a monograph published shortly after 
Dred Scott was handed down. "(S]hould (Congress] make a dis-
tinction between (the Southern people] and the North in regard 
to the national domain," he declared, "then the great republican 
principle of equality before the law would be violated."Is4 Jus-
tice McLean's claim that bans on slavery would encourage per-
sons from free states to populate the territories,1ss probably 
strengthened the Taney Court's resolve that such policies were 
unconstitutional instances of partial legislation. 
Historicists who claim that Taney's substantive reading of 
the due process clause is a "momentous sham,"Is6 never ac-
knowledge that Abraham Lincoln and his antislavery supporters 
promulgated similar constitutional "abominations." A strong 
strand of Northern legal opinion maintained that the Fifth 
Amendment required federal bans on slavery in the territories. 
"(T]he (due process] clause," Salmon Chase and other prominent 
abolitionists asserted, "prohibits the General Government from 
sanctioning slaveholding, and renders the continuance of slavery, 
as a legal relation, in any place of exclusive national jurisdiction, 
impossible."1s1 The Republican Party Platforms of 1856 and 
151. Danmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 581 (1819) (argument of Daniel 
Webster). See Clapp & Albright v. Administrator of Reynolds, 2 Tex. Rep. 250, 252 
(1847); Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yerg.) 260, 271 (1829) (Catron, J., concurring); 
State Bank v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yerg.) 599, 605-07 (1831). For general discussions of 
class legislation before the Civil War, see Rodney L Mott, Due Process of Law 259-66 
(The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1926); Gillman, The Constitution Besieged at 50-55, 59-60 (cited 
in note 150); Edward Keynes, Liberty, Property, and Privacy: Toward a Jurisprudence of 
Substantive Due Process 23-29 (Penn. State U. Press, 1996). 
152. Wally's Heir v. Kennedy, 10 Tenn. (2 Yerg.) 554, 555-56 (1831). 
153. See Corwin, Dred Scott Case at 306 (cited in note 12). 
154. Sidney George Fisher, The Law of the Te"itories 51 (C. Sherman & Son, 1859). 
155. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 543 (McLean, J., dissenting). 
156. Bork, The Tempting of America at 31-32 (cited in note 6). 
157. Samuel Portland Chase and Charles Dexter Cleveland, Anti-Slavery Addresses 
of 1844 and 1845 at 86 (Sampson Low, Son, and Marston, 1867). See also id. at 17, 101; 
William Goodell, Our National Charters 74-76 (Goodell, 1861); Liberty Party Platform of 
1844, in Johnson, ed., National Party Platforms at 5 (cited in note 50); Theodore Dwight 
Weld, The Power of Congress over the District of Columbia 40 (J.F. Trow, 1838). 
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1860 explicitly declared that the federal government could not 
establish slavery in the territories because that policy would de-
prive enslaved blacks of their liberty without due process of 
law.158 Other abolitionists found similar substantive prohibitions 
on slavery in the privileges and immunities clause and the guar-
antee clause of Article IV.159 Indeed, as William Wiecek notes, 
"the foundation of radical constitutionalism was ... an emphasis 
on the legally binding force of naturallaw,"I60 rather than an ap-
peal to the specific policies intended by the framers. Chase was 
one of many abolitionists who believed that because "[s]lavery is 
... contrary to natural right .... The right to hold a man as a 
slave ... is a right which, in its own nature, can have no existence 
beyond the territorial limits of the state which sanctions it."l61 
Unlike contemporary historicists, influential antebellum crit-
ics of Dred Scott agreed that Americans had an unenumerated 
constitutional right to bring their property into the territories. 
Because "the Territories are common property of the States," 
Justice McLean declared in his dissent, "every man has a right to 
go there with his property."I62 McLean disputed Taney's conclu-
sion only because the former maintained that "a slave is not a 
mere chattel."163 Following abolitionist logic, McLean refused to 
regard "a slave [as] property beyond the operation of the local 
law which makes him such."164 Abraham Lincoln offered a simi-
lar analysis of federal power in the territories. "[T]he slave-
holder [would have] the same [political] right to take his negroes 
to Kansas that a freeman has to take his hogs or his horses," he 
informed his fellow citizens, "if negroes were property in the 
same sense that hogs and horses are."I65 As late as 1901, 
Supreme Court opinions treated the Lincoln/McLean position as 
good constitutional law. Justice Homer Billings Brown in 
Downes v. Bidwell declared that "[i]f ... slaves [were] indistin-
158. Republican Platform of 1856, in Johnson, ed., National Party Platforms at 27 
(cited in note 50); Republican Platform of 1860, in Johnson, ed., National Party Platforms 
at 32 (cited in note 50). 
159. See also, Lysander Spooner, The Unconstilutionality of Slavery 105-114 (Burt 
Franklin, reprinted 1965, originally published 1860); William M. Wiecek, The Sources of 
Antislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-1848 at 268-71 (Cornell U. Press, 1977). 
160. Wiecek, Antislavery Constitutionalism at 259 (cited in note 159). 
161. Salmon Portland Chase, Speech of Salmon P. Chase, in the Case of the Colored 
Woman, Matilda 8 (Pugh & Dodd, Printers, 1837). See Spooner, Unconstitutionality of 
Slavery at 7-10, 14, 17-18, 36-38, 43-44, 59-60, 62-63 (cited in note 159). 
162. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 549 (McLean, J., dissenting). 
163. ld. at 550. 
164. Id. at 549-50 (McLean, J., dissenting). 
165. Lincoln, 2 Collected Works, 245,264 (cited in note 55); Cong. Globe, 31st Cong., 
1 Sess., App., 479 (speech of Salmon Chase). 
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guishable from other property, the inference from the Dred Scott 
case is irresistible that Congress had no power to prohibit their 
introduction into a territory. "166 
McLean, Lincoln and Brown could oppose Dred Scott be-
cause they relied on what they believed were the Constitution's 
antislavery aspirations. The Taney Court's opinion was wrong, in 
their opinion, because that decision violated an unenumerated 
constitutional right to liberty. Once the general right to take 
property into the territories is conceded, however, more histori-
cally oriented constitutionalists may find little ground for making 
a unique exception for property in human beings. As a northern 
federal court noted in another context, "[h]ow is it possible ... to 
regard slave property as less effectively secured by the provisions 
of [the Constitution] than any other property which is recognized 
as such by the law of the owner's domicil [sic]?"167 
Most significantly from an originalist perspective, the Dred 
Scott majority could cite the Father of the Constitution in support 
of their assertion that Congress had no power to ban slavery in 
the territories. In an 1819 letter quoted at length in Justice 
Daniel's opinion,168 Madison informed a correspondent that 
"[n]othing in the proceedings of the State Conventions" evinced 
an intention to give Congress "a power over the migration or 
removal of individuals, whether freemen or slaves, from one 
State to another, whether new or old." "Had such been the con-
struction," Madison added, the Constitution might not have been 
ratified. Yet, he noted, "among the objections to the Constitu-
tion, and among the numerous amendments to it proposed by the 
State Conventions, not one of which amendments refers to the 
[territorial] clause."169 Madison further observed that political 
practice from 1787 unti11819 had strengthened the constitutional 
right to bring slaves into American territories. In language that 
recalled his objections to John Marshall's opinion in McCulloch 
v. Marylandpo Madison declared that the territorial clause 
merely gave Congress "a power to make the provisions really 
needful or necessary for the government of settlers." "[T]he in-
terdict of slavery [in the territories]" could hardly be regarded as 
"among the needful regulations contemplated by the Constitu-
166. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 274 (1901). 
167. United States ex reL Wheeler v. Williamson, 28 Fed. Cas. 686, 693 (1855). 
168. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 491-92 (Daniel, J., concurring). 
169. James Madison to Robert Walsh, Nov. 27, 1819, 3 Letters and Other Writings of 
James Madison 150-52 (R. Worthington, 1884). 
170. 17 u.s. 316 (1819). 
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tion," he concluded, "since in none of the territorial governments 
created by [Congress] is such an interdict found."m 
Madison's constitutional argument against a ban on slavery 
in the territories hardly clinches the historical case for Dred 
Scott. Surviving records reveal almost no discussion of the issue 
during the constitutional convention and subsequent ratification 
debates.ln In sharp contrast to Madison, Northern framers liv-
ing in 1820 maintained that they did intend to vest Congress with 
the power to ban slavery.173 Madison also "forgot" that the First 
Congress had voted almost unanimously to prohibit slavery in 
the Northwest Territories.174 This exercise of legislative power 
played a major role in both Dred Scott dissents.17S Justice Curtis 
effectively demolished the lame efforts in the majority opinions 
to explain away the congressional ban on slavery in the North-
west Territories.176 Finally, Supreme Court precedent seemed 
clearly on the side of the Dred Scott dissents. Chief Justice John 
Marshall's 1828 ruling in American Ins. Co. v. Canter that when 
"legislating for [the territories], Congress exercises the combined 
powers of the general, and of a state govemment"I77 strongly 
supports the Curtis/McLean position because, as Fehrenbacher 
171. Madison to Walsh, in 3 Letters at 152-53 (cited in note 169). See also, James 
Madison to James Monroe, February 23, 1820, in 3 Letters at 168 (cited in note 169). 
172. John P. Kaminski's compilation of references to slavery during the ratification 
debates contains only one reference to slavery in the territories. Pennsylvania Ratifying 
Convention Debates, in Kaminski, ed., A Necessary Evil? at 137 (cited in note 111) (James 
Wilson claiming that Congress had power to ban slavery in the territories). 
173. Jay to Elias Boudinot, November 17, 1819, in Henry P. Johnston, ed., 4 The Cor-
respondence and Public Papers of John Jay 430-31 (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1893); Rufus 
King, The Substilnce of Two Speeches on the Missouri Bill Delivered by Mr. King in the 
Senate of the United States, in Charles R. King, ed., 6 The Life and Correspondence of 
Rufus King 690-703 (G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1900). 
174. 1 Stat. 50 (1789) (Act to provide for the Government of the Territory Northwest 
of the river Ohio, Art. VI). 
175. See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 539-40, 547 (McLean, J, dissenting); id. at 
617 (Curtis, J., dissenting). See also Lincoln, 3 Collected Works at 527-35 (cited in note 
55) (discussing founding fathers who endorsed the prohibition of slavery in the Northwest 
Territories); Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 370 (cited in note 24). Justice Curtis 
did agree that the ban on slavery in the Northwest Ordinance was void because Congress 
under the Articles of Confederation lacked the power to govern the territories. Dred 
Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 608, 617 (Curtis, J., dissenting). See also id. at 490 (Daniel, J., 
concurring); id. at 503-04 (Campbell, J., concurring). Madison in Federalist 38 also de-
clared that the Northwest Ordinance was passed "without the least color of constitutional 
authority." Federalist 38 (Madison) in The Federalist Papers 231, 239 (Arlington House, 
1966). 
176. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 605-33 (Curtis, J., dissenting). See Lowell and 
Gray, Legal Review at 28-30 (cited in note 117). 
177. 26 u.s. 511, 546 (1828). 
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notes, "no one questioned the power of a state to prohibit 
slavery."11s 
Nevertheless, from an historical perspective, the Dred Scott 
dissents have as many weaknesses as the majority opinions. 
Neither Curtis nor McLean gave any explanation as to why such 
states as South Carolina would have consented to a constitu-
tional provision that empowered the national government to ban 
slavery in all territories. This point is particularly troubling from 
an originalist perspective because the southern framers alive dur-
ing the Missouri Crisis of 1819-20 publicly stated that they had 
not intended to grant that authority to Congress.179 Moreover, 
although Curtis criticized methods of constitutional interpreta-
tion that replaced "a republican Government, with limited and 
defined powers," with "a Government which is merely an expo-
nent of the will of Congress,"1so his method of constitutional in-
terpretation yielded that undesirable result, at least with respect 
to the territories. Five pages before condemning any method of 
constitutional interpretation that gave the national legislature 
unlimited powers, Curtis declared that "[t]here is nothing ... 
which qualifies the grant of power" to Congress in the territorial 
clause. "Regulations must be needful," he stated, "but it is nec-
essarily left to the legislative discretion to determine whether a 
law be needful. "1s1 
This broad interpretation of "needful" plays a crucial role in 
contemporary critiques of Dred Scott. The late twentieth-century 
legal mind regards elected officials as having the power to regu-
late property in any way that might plausibly be regarded as a 
rational means to a legitimate government end.182 Hence, 
Fehrenbacher and others never doubt that McLean was on solid 
historical ground when the Ohio justice explicitly cited McCul-
loch for the proposition that Congress was the sole judge of 
"needful regulations." "[T]he degree of its necessity," both Cur-
tis and McLean insisted, "is a question of legislative discretion, 
not of judicial cognizance."183 Many framers, however, sharply 
178. Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 373 (cited in note 24 ). 
179. Madison to Walsh, 3 Letters at 150-52 (cited in note 169); Annals of Congress, 
16th Cong., 1st Sess. 1312, 1315-22, 1326-27 (Feb., 1820) (statement of Charles Pinckney). 
180. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 621 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
181. ld. at 616 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
182. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); Wickard v. 
Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
183. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 542 (McLean, J., dissenting) (quoting McCul-
loch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)); id. at 616 (Curtis, J., dissenting) (quoted 
above); Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 369 (cited in note 24) (defending a simi-
larly broad view of "all needful rules"). 
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disputed John Marshall's claim that "necessary ... [means] no 
more than ... useful, or essential."t84 Madison, in particular, 
claimed with respect to McCulloch that "it was anticipated ... by 
few, if any, of the friends of the Constitution, that a rule of con-
struction would be introduced as broad and pliant as what has 
occurred."tss Indeed, McCulloch may have survived the Taney 
Court only because Jacksonian presidents vetoed on constitu-
tional grounds every measure that might have given the justices 
an opportunity to overrule or narrow Marshall's broad concep-
tion of national powef.186 Given the sparse historical record on 
the original meaning of "necessary" in the Constitution,ts7 the 
more narrow interpretation underlying the Daniel concurrence 
in Dred Scotttss has as good an historical pedigree as the 
Hamiltonian interpretation that animated the Curtis and McLean 
dissents. 
Contemporary historicists may also be mistaken when they 
use the Northwest Ordinance to demonstrate that Congress had 
the constitutional authority to ban slavery in all American terri-
tories. Implicit in that Ordinance was an understanding that slav-
ery would be permitted in more southern latitudes.1S9 This 
arrangement was continued by the Missouri Compromise, which 
essentially divided the Louisiana Purchase between the North 
184. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413. 
185. Madison to Roane, 3 Letters at 145 (cited in note 169). See Madison, To the 
House of Representatives, in Myers, Mind of the Founder at 391, 392 (cited in note 150). 
186. No justice in the Dred Scott majority ever cited McCulloch to support broad 
federal power. Several Taney Court justices were previously on record as opposed to the 
Marshall Court's interpretation of "necessary." See Swisher, Taney at 194-97 (cited in 
note 3); Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. 151, 180-81 (1845) (Daniel, J., dissenting). See also, 
Merrill D. Peterson, The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay, and Calhoun 306 (Oxford U. 
Press, 1987) (claiming that the Supreme Court would have declared unconstitutional the 
bank bill that President Tyler vetoed in 1841 ). 
For presidential vetoes clearly rejecting Marshall's interpretation of "necessary," see 
James Monroe, Veto Message in 2 Messages and Papers at 142-43 (cited in note 49) (no 
power to establish toll roads); Andrew Jackson, Veto Message in 2 Messages and Papers at 
576-91 (cited in note 49) (no power to establish a national bank); John Tyler, Veto 
Messages in 4 Messages and Papers at 63-72 (cited in note 49) (no power to incorporate a 
bank); James K. Polk, Veto Messages in 4 Messages and Papers at 460-66 (cited in note 49) 
(no power to construct local improvements); Franklin Pierce, Veto Messages in 5 Messages 
and Papers at 247-56 (cited in note 49) (no power to construct hospitals for the insane); 
James Buchanan, Veto Messages in 5 Messages and Papers at 543-50 (cited in note 49) (no 
power over education). 
187. See Mark A. Graber, Unnecessary and Unintelligible, 12 Const. Comm. 167 
(1995). 
188. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 491-92 (Daniel, J., concurring). 
189. See Finkelman, Slavery at 36 (cited in note 40); Staughton Lynd, Class Conflict, 
Slavery, and the United States Constitution 186, 190-93, 199 (Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1967); 
Donald L. Robinson, Slavery in the Structure of American Politics 1765-1820 at 382-85 
(Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1971). 
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and South.190 These measures suggested an ongoing arrange-
ment between moderates in both sections of the United States to 
allocate the territories equally between the North and South. 
Sidney Fisher offered a variation on this theme when he declared 
that the Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise 
were constitutional only because those measures were secured 
"with the consent and co-operation of the Southern States. "191 
Fisher's claim that "to exclude the people of the slave States 
... , without their consent, would be unequal and opposed to the 
spirit and intent of the Constitution"192 may be the most plausi-
ble historicist understanding of federal power in the territories. 
Unlike any opinion in Dred Scott, Fisher could explain Southern 
consent to a document that permitted Congress to pass the 
Northwest Ordinance and the Missouri Compromise. If Fisher 
was right, then both Taney and Curtis were wrong. Congress 
could ban slavery in some territories, but not, as the Dred Scott 
minority suggested, by a simple majority vote. Still, the Taney 
majority opinion seems much closer than the dissents to this orig-
inal understanding of the territorial clause. The majority opin-
ions in Dred Scott maintained, albeit in a form much more 
favorable to the south, the principle of equal access to the territo-
ries. Indeed, the practical difference between the Fisher thesis 
and the Dred Scott decision did not amount to much after 1850, 
given Southern intransigence on any future federal ban on slav-
ery in the territories. The Republican party platform and the 
Dred Scott dissents, by comparison, would grant Northern major-
ities the absolute power to ban slavery in all territories. By so 
doing, Lincoln, Curtis and McLean abandoned the implicit con-
stitutional restrictions on federal power over slavery that appear 
to have existed throughout antebellum history.193 
C. THE ASPIRATIONAL CRITIQUE 
The flaws in the aspirationalist critique of Dred Scott, not 
surprisingly, mirror the flaws in the historicist critique of that de-
cision. The justices in the Dred Scott majority relied at crucial 
junctures in their arguments on general principles of justice, and 
the general principles of justice they relied on had strong roots in 
both the Constitution and the American political tradition. That 
190. See Peterson, Great Triumvirate at 65 (cited in note 186) (noting that some 
southerners believed the larger northern territories would not be settled until the distant 
future); Robinson, Slavery at 416 (cited in note 189). 
191. Fisher, Law of the Te"itories at 50, 44, 65 (cited in note 154). 
192. ld. at 50-52, 63. 
193. Id. at 79-80 (claiming the Republican position was unconstitutional). 
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present-day Americans regard those principles as pernicious is 
beside the point. Justices who make aspirational arguments will 
base their rulings on those values that, upon reflection, they 
think place the constitutional order in its best light.194 For south-
em Jacksonian jurists in the mid-nineteenth century, those values 
included both slavery and white supremacy. 
Aspirationalists are clearly wrong when they claim that Dred 
Scott demonstrates the need for justices to temper the framers' 
intentions and legal precedent with general principles of justice. 
A plausible historicist case can be made that black persons in 
1857 could be or become American citizens and that Congress 
had the power to ban slavery in the territories. Both dissents in 
Dred Scott made extensive use of originalist and doctrinal argu-
ments, and most contemporary aspirationalists confess that those 
dissents had the better of the historical argument on several 
points.195 Justice McLean offered a detailed history of the terri-
torial clause, the Northwest Ordinance and John Marshall's opin-
ion in American Ins. Co. v. Canter196 to support his claim that 
Congress had the power to prohibit slavery in American territo-
ries.197 Justice Curtis referred at length to the history of the priv-
ileges and immunities clause of Article IV, which he concluded 
"clear[ly]" demonstrated that "at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution, free colored persons of African descent might be, 
and, by reason of their citizenship in certain States, were entitled 
to the privileges and immunities of general citizenship of the 
United States."I9s Indeed, Curtis seemed to reject aspirational 
reasoning emphatically. "[G]eneral considerations concerning 
the social and moral evils of slavery," he bluntly declared, are 
"reasons purely political" which "render[] ... judicial interpreta-
tion impossible-because judicial tribunals . . . cannot decide 
upon political considerations. "199 
More significantly, a proslavery aspirationalist could easily 
reach both central holdings of Chief Justice Taney's opinion. 
Scholars who celebrate "the liberal tradition in the United 
States" may see slavery and racism as political practices or com-
promises that are incompatible with broader constitutional prin-
194. See Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 45-86, 355-99 (Harvard U. Press, 1986). 
195. See Eisgruber, 10 Const. Comm. at 48-49 (cited in note 7). 
1%. 26 u.s. 511 (1828). 
197. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 535-41 (McLean, J., dissenting). 
198. ld. at 575-76 (Curtis, J., dissenting). 
199. I d. at 620 (Curtis, J., dissenting). For a similar historicist assertion, see Spooner, 
Unconstitutionality of Slavery at 124 (cited in note 159). 
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ciples,zoo but more recent works indicate that racist and other 
ascriptive ideologies are as rooted in the American political tra-
dition as liberal, democratic and republican ideals.2o1 Racism, in 
particular, was well grounded in American political thought from 
the very beginning. Although most framers believed that slavery 
was wrong and inconsistent with the ideals expressed by the Dec-
laration of Independence,202 the vast majority of the persons re-
sponsible for the Constitution did not think as a matter of 
political principle or prudence that a multiracial society was de-
sirable. "Nothing is more certainly written in the book of fate," 
Jefferson asserted, "than that these two people are to be free; nor 
is it less certain that the two races, equally free, cannot live in the 
same government. "zo3 For this reason, moderate antislavery 
leaders supported schemes that would immediately transport 
freed slaves to their original homeland, thus ensuring that free 
blacks and whites would avoid sharing the same civic space. As 
William Freehling notes, Jefferson and his fellow framers "tie[ d] 
American emancipation to African colonization."204 "It is im-
possible for us to be happy," a delegate to the North Carolina 
ratification debate declared, "if, after manumission, they are to 
stay among us."zos A 1775 proposal to free slaves who fought for 
American independence would secure racial homogeneity by re-
warding blacks with land in Canada.206 
Mainstream emancipation programs after the Revolution 
were similarly hostile to integration and almost always included 
mandatory colonization for blacks. Madison admitted "the inad-
missibility of emancipation without deportation." Jefferson em-
phasized the importance of "provid[ing] an asylum to which we 
200. See generally Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America (Harcourt, Brace 
and Co., 1955). See also Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem 
and Modern Democracy 523-26 (Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1944). 
201. See especially Rogers M. Smith, Beyond Tocqueville, Myrdal, and Hartz: The 
Multiple Traditions in America, 87 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 549 (1993). 
202. See Raymond T. Diamond, No Call to Glory: Thurgood Marshall's Thesis On 
the Intent of a Pro-Slavery Constitution, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 93, 104 n.64 (1989) (quoting 
Patrick Henry, George Washington, and Thomas Jefferson); William W. Freehling, The 
Founding Fathers and Slavery, 77 Am. Hist. Rev. 81, 82 (1972). 
203. Thomas Jefferson, Autobiography, in Adrienne Koch and William Peden, eds., 
The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson 51 (Modem Library, 1944). 
204. Freehling, 77 Am. Hist. Rev. at 83 (cited in note 202). See William W. Freehling, 
The Reintegration of American History: Slavery and the Civil War 257, 270 (Oxford U. 
Press, 1994). 
205. North Carolina Ratifying Convention Debates, in Kaminski, ed., A Necessary 
Evil? at 199 (cited in note 111) (statement of James Galloway). 
206. A Proposal to Free the Slaves, in Kaminski, ed., A Necessary Evil? at 4-5 (cited in 
note 111). See Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant, A Plan to Free the Slaves, in Kaminski, ed., 
A Necessary Evil? at 11 (cited in note 111). 
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can, by degrees, send the whole of that population from among 
us."zo1 Such efforts to rid the Old Dominion of all persons of 
color was a central concern of antebellum Virginia politics. The 
so-called "Virginia 'Antislavery' Debate" of 1831-32, commenta-
tors point out, is better labeled "the Virginia Deportation 
Debate."zos 
Conservative and moderate Republicans also insisted that 
"colonization [was] the next step after emancipation."z09 "The 
idea of liberating the slaves and allowing them to remain in the 
country," Lincoln's confidant Frank Blair declared, "is one that 
never will be tolerated."21o Even Republicans who opposed col-
onization described their coalition as a "white man's party" and 
proposed to settle the western Territories with "free, white 
men."zu The "main impulse" of many Republicans, the New 
York Tribune admitted, "is a desire to secure the new Territories 
for Free White Labor, with little or no regard for the interests of 
negroes, free or slave."z12 David Wilmot, the author of the Wil-
mot Proviso, "would preserve to free white labor a fair country, a 
rich inheritance, where the sons of toil, of my own race and own 
color, can live without the disgrace which association with negro 
slavery brings upon free labor."z13 Historians suggest that Wil-
mot and several of his allies "may have been more anti-black 
than John C. Calhoun. "214 
207. Madison, Reply to Thomas Dew, in Myers, ed., Mind of the Founder at 421,423 
(cited in note 150); Thomas Jefferson to Jared Sparks, February 4, 1824, in Kaminski, ed., 
A Necessary Evil at 264-67 (cited in note 111}. See Ruffner, Address to the People of West 
Virginia at 39-40 (cited in note 88); Harrison, Review of the Slave Question at 25, 34-48 
(cited in note 88); Thcker, Dissertation on Slavery at 94-95 (cited in note 107) (banishment 
encouraged, but not mandated). 
208. Freehling, Road to Disunion at 195 (cited in note 83). 
209. Curtis, 68 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. at 1125 (cited in note 85). 
210. Foner, Free Soil at 270 (cited in note 51) (quoting Frank Blair). See Cong. 
Globe, 36th Cong., 1st sess. 60 (speech of Senator Trumbull}; Foner, Free Soil at 267-79 
(cited in note 51); Litwack, North of Slavery at 29, 62-63,277-78 (cited in note 52). Abra-
ham Lincoln is the best known prominent antislavery advocate who regarded colonization 
as the proper, if not the only, solution to the potential race problems that would result 
after emancipation. See, e.g., Lincoln, in 2 Collected Works at 131-32, 409 (cited in note 
55). 
211. Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess., App. 91 (speech of William Cumback); 
Lyman Trumbull, Great Speech of Senator Trumbull on the Issues of the Day 12 (Lost 
Cause Press, 1966). 
212. Foner, Free Soil at 61 (cited in note 51} (quoting the New York Tribune, Oct. 15, 
1856). See also Lincoln, 2 Collected Works at 363 (cited in note 55) ("Have we no interest 
in the free Territories . . . that they should be kept open for the homes of free white 
people?"); Lincoln, Debates at 315-16 (cited in note 83); Lincoln, 3 Collected Works at 437 
(cited in note 55) (noting free white man's claim to the new territory). 
213. Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 2d Sess., App. 317 (speech of David Wilmot). 
214. Freehling, Road to Disunion at 459 (cited in note 83); Litwack, North of Slavery 
at 267-69 (cited in note 52) (noting Stephan Douglas' racism). 
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Aggressive defenses of human bondage flourished only after 
the 1820s, but some framers, particularly those from South Caro-
lina, believed that a commercial republic should aspire to slavery. 
Northern mercantile interests would become more sympathetic 
to the South's peculiar institution, a contributor to a Columbia 
newspaper suggested, once New Englanders realized that "[t]he 
more rice we make, the more business will be for their ship-
ping. "215 By the time Dred Scott was decided, homilies to the 
virtues of slavery were staples in Southern judicial opinions.216 
Members of the Georgia Supreme Court, in particular, made ex-
tensive use of aspirational arguments in opinions that limited 
manumission and the rights of free negroes. Slavery, the judges 
opined in 1854, "was wisely ordained by a forecast high as 
heaven above man's, for the good of both races."211 Three years 
later, that bench implored "women and old men, and persons of 
weak and infirm minds, [to] be disabused of the false and un-
founded notion that slavery is sinful, and that they will peril their 
souls if they do not disinherit their offspring by emancipating 
their slaves!"21s 
The Dred Scott opinions articulated these racist aspirations. 
Black persons, Taney declared, were "regarded as beings of an 
inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the white 
race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that 
they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect."219 
Justice Daniel similarly relied on general principles of constitu-
tional justice when he asserted that slavery enjoyed special con-
stitutional status as "the only private property which the 
Constitution has specifically recognised [sic], and has imposed it 
as a direct obligation both on the States and the Federal Govern-
ment to protect and entorce."22o Even if Taney actually reached 
his conclusions in Dred Scott by strict adherence to historical 
215. Robert M. Weir, Slavery and the Structure of the Union, in Michael Allen Gilles-
pie and Michael Lienesch, eds., Ratifying the Constitution 201, 216 (U. Press of Kansas, 
1989). 
216. See Mitchell v. Wells-, 37 Miss. 235, 238 (1859); American Colonization Society v. 
Gartrell, 23 Ga. 448, 461-65 (1857); Vance v. Crawford, 4 Ga. 445, 459 (1848); Bryan v. 
Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 205-06 (1853). 
217. Cleland v. Waters, 16 Ga. 496, 514 (1854). 
218. Gartrell, 23 Ga. at 465. For similar proslavery aspirations, see Pendleton v. State, 
6 Ark. 509, 511-12 (1846); Fisher's Negroes v. Dabbs, 14 Tenn. 119, 125-31 (1834); Bryan, 
14 Ga. at 205-06; Vance, 4 Ga. at 459; Mitchell, 37 Miss. at 238. 
219. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407. 
220. Id. at 490 (Daniel, J. concurring). Unlike Taney, Daniel explicitly regarded nat-
ural law as a legitimate source for constitutional interpretation. "The natural society of 
nations," he declared, "cannot subsist unless the natural rights of each be respected." I d. 
at 483. 
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methods of constitutional interpretation, no reason exists for 
thinking that the result would have been different had the Chief 
Justice relied more heavily on aspirational logic. Although his 
feelings on slavery, particularly as a young man, were somewhat 
ambivalent, Taney was throughout his life committed to white 
rule and southern culture.z21 Indeed, he informed a correspon-
dent that he thought the Court's ruling in Dred Scott would pro-
mote the interests of both races.222 
III. THE TYRANNY OF EXAMPLES 
Dred Scott is not an example of what is wrong with any con-
ception of the judicial function in constitutional cases. Rather, 
Dred Scott demonstrates how in the wrong hands or in the wrong 
circumstances all constitutional theories may yield unjust conclu-
sions. The justices in the Dred Scott majority relied on institu-
tional, historical and aspirational arguments that, while often 
strained, were not substantially weaker from a pure craft per-
spective than the institutional, historical and aspirational argu-
ments made by the dissenters in Dred Scott. Taney was able to 
use these constitutional modalities in his opinion because all 
forms of constitutional logic are capable of yielding evil results. 
Institutional arguments yield evil results whenever elected offi-
cials and popular majorities support evil laws. Historical argu-
ments yield evil results whenever constitutional framers and 
ratifiers constitutionalize evil practices. Aspirational arguments 
yield evil results whenever constitutional framers and ratifiers 
have evil constitutional values. 
In specific cases, of course, some theories perform better 
than others. Dred Scott may be no exception. Perhaps the Taney 
Court would have reached the just result in that case had the 
majority relied exclusively on the "right" theory of the judicial 
role in constitutional cases. Still, contemporary commentators 
who use Dred Scott to highlight how the constitutional theories 
advanced by their rivals may lead to injustice routinely ignore 
other issues raised by the American law of slavery where their 
preferred theory fares worse. All constitutional theories, when 
221. See Swisher, Taney at 586-88 (cited in note 3); Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott 
Case at 552-55, 557-61 (cited in note 24). 
222. Swisher, Taney at 516-18 (cited in note 3) (quoting Taney to Rev. Samuel Nott, 
August 19, 1857). See Fehrenbacher, The Dred Scott Case at 554-55 (cited in note 24) 
(discussing a long proslavery memorandum that Taney wrote in 1860, but never made 
public). Justice Wayne also had a lifelong commitment to racial supremacy. See Alexan-
der A. Lawrence, James Moore Wayne: Southern Unionist 143 (U. of North Carolina 
Press, 1943). 
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applied to the various constitutional controversies of the 1850s, 
are vulnerable to uniquely evil outcomes, proslavery results that 
might have been avoided had the justices relied on some other 
approach to the judicial function. 
Institutionalists who advocate judicial deference to elected 
officials would be inclined to sustain constitutionally dubious 
proslavery legislation. Consider the Fugitive Slave Acts that 
Congress passed in 1793 and 1850.223 Both historical and aspira-
tional theories provide strong grounds for declaring these stat-
utes unconstitutional. An historicist could point out that the 
language used by the fugitive slave clause224 and its placement in 
Article IV rather than Article I of the Constitution (which lists 
national powers) indicates that the framers vested Congress with 
no power over fugitive slaves. The fugitive slave clause, in this 
common view, merely established state obligations.225 An anti-
slavery aspirationalist would regard the fugitive slave clause as a 
constitutional contradiction that courts should either ignore or 
interpret as narrowly as possible.226 Proponents of judicial re-
straint, on the other hand, would probably be compelled to sus-
tain the Fugitive Slave Acts because those measures were not 
clearly unconstitutional. If popular majorities believed that the 
federal government should assist slave catchers in the rendition 
process or give slave catchers immunities from hostile state laws, 
then a judge committed to institutionalism would have to let the 
people have their way. 
Judges committed to historical theories of judicial review 
might feel obliged to strike down any federal antislavery legisla-
tion not limited to the territories or the international slave trade. 
Consider a federal law that promoted freedom within a state, say 
a measure requiring states to keep manumission legal (or even a 
total ban on slavery). Both institutional and aspirational theories 
provide strong reasons for sustaining such statutes. A proponent 
of judicial restraint would argue that the court should not second 
guess whatever slavery policies the people's national representa-
tives thought best. An antislavery aspirationalist would see such 
223. 1 Stat. 302 (1793); 9 Stat. 462 (1850). 
224. No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, 
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, 
be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim 
of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due. 
U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 2, cl. 3. 
225. See Chase, Speech of Salmon P. Chase at 17-27 (cited in note 161); Currie, The 
Constitution at 243 (cited in note 5); Fmkelman, Slavery at 100-02 (cited in note 40). 
226. Sotirios A. Barber, On What the Constitution Means 199-201 (Johns Hopkins U. 
Press, 1984). 
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measures as fulfilling the antislavery aspirations of the constitu-
tion. An historicist, however, might be compelled to declare 
such antislavery measures unconstitutional. At least in 1857, a 
clear consensus existed that "Congress had no power to interfere 
with slavery as it exists in the States, or to regulate what is called 
the slave trade among them. "227 
The vulnerability of aspirational theories to unique prosla-
very outcomes is more complicated. An antislavery aspirational-
ist would reach every antislavery result that an institutionalist or 
historicist would reach, and might sometimes reach antislavery 
results that could not be obtained by alternative approaches to 
the judicial function. A proslavery aspirationalist, however, 
would not only reach every proslavery result that an institution-
alist or historicist would reach, but such a judge would sometimes 
reach proslavery results that could not be obtained by other 
means. Consider the result of Dred Scott had Scott sued for his 
freedom in Illinois. Both institutional and aspirational theories 
seem to compel a judicial decision in favor of freedom. An insti-
tutionalist would, absent national legislation, defer to Illinois' 
judgment that slaves became free when voluntarily taken to Illi-
nois. An historicist would defer to the framers' judgment that 
Illinois have the authority to determine the status of slavery in 
Illinois. A proslavery aspirationalist, however, could by citing 
the comity clause22s or perhaps a more general constitutional 
right to travel,229 insist that slaveowners had a right to bring their 
slaves along when they journeyed or temporarily resided in free 
states.23o 
Dred Scott and law of slavery confound contemporary con-
stitutional theorists who proclaim that the Constitution is nearly 
perfect when properly interpreted. All prominent theories of the 
judicial function in constitutional cases yield proslavery results in 
the right circumstances. No prominent theory could have prom-
ised perfectly just outcomes during the 1850s because American 
227. Dred Scott, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 536-37 (McLean, J., dissenting); see also id. at 
500 (Campbell, J., concurring). Lincoln, in particular, repeatedly asserted that the federal 
government had no constitutional power to regulate slavery within states. See Lincoln, 2 
Collected Works at 230-31, 492 (cited in note 55); Lincoln, Debates at 52, 131-32 (cited in 
note 70); Lincoln, 3 Collected Works at 77-78, 96,327, 329, 334,402,404,435,439-40, 460 
(cited in note 55); Lincoln, 4 Collected Works at 5, 162, 258, 263, 270 (cited in note 55). 
228. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of 
Citizens in the several States." U.S. Const., Art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. 
229. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
230. For one such argument that relied on "fundamental principles" and "natural 
rights" see Cong. Globe, 35th Cong., 1st Sess., App. 199 (speech of Charles E. Stuart) 
(quoting the Washington Union, Nov. 11, 1857). 
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popular majorities supported racist practices, because the fram-
ers in 1787 provided some degree of protection for a racist insti-
tution, and because many framers had racist aspirations. Dred 
Scott is an evil decision because slavery and white supremacy are 
evil practices, and not because some flaw existed in the interpre-
tive modalities adopted by the Taney Court. Unfortunately, con-
stitutional commentators who pretend that devotees of their 
theory would see, say and do no evil never address the central 
question Dred Scott raises. What does a judge or any other per-
son obligated to interpret the Constitution do when their pre-
ferred theory of constitutional interpretation yields an evil 
result? 
